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The Faux Scholarship Foundation of
the Regulatory Rollback Movement
Richard W. Parker*
With the full participation and consent of Congress, President Trump has
embarked upon a radical project to freeze and roll back federal regulations that
protect public health, safety, the environment, and the economy. The principal
justification for this project, publicly announced by both Congress and President
Trump, is the claim that regulations are costing the American economy $2
trillion per year, thereby destroying jobs. This claim derives from two studies
that have received wide and credulous circulation in the media, on Capitol Hill,
and in the White House. This Article accordingly undertakes a comprehensive
evaluation of these two studies. It will show that their methods are deeply flawed
and their results far too weakly grounded to serve as the basis for a major policy
shift. It also will examine the techniques used in these studies to give ungrounded
numbers the veneer of credibility. The goal of this exercise is to equip the lay
reader with insights needed to spot similar deceptions in the future. This Article
will demonstrate that, ultimately, the "aggregate cost of regulation "' is at once
unknown, unknowable, and unnecessary to sound regulatory policy. The studies
examined in this Article do not establish that regulations are costing more jobs
than they create, or reducing the U.S. Gross Domestic Product by any amount
close to $2 trillion per year. They do, however, highlight the impact of an
archipelago ofantiregulatory advocacy groups andpolicy centers that regularly
sponsor and issue studies that overstate the cost of regulation using methods that
seem plausible on a quick read but that do not withstand close scrutiny. For
better or worse, such studies-and the centers that issue them-form a part of
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our national discourse. Policy makers, judges, scholars, and journalists should
be aware, and wary, of them. Meanwhile, the fact that the House of
Representatives explicitly relied on bogus studies to justify a radical set of de-
regulatory proposals is itself a reason for alarm: it demonstrates that Congress
lacks any reliable mechanism for data quality assurance or truth-check in its
legislative process. Given the complexity of most issues and Congress' vast
power to legislate for good or ill, this is a serious institutional deficiency.
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REGULA TORY ROLLBA CK MO VEMENT
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.
Madmen in authority.. . are distilling theirfrenzyfrom some academic scribbler
ofa few years back.
- John Maynard Keynes'
Falsehoodflies and the truth comes limping after it, so that when men come
to be undeceived, it is too late; the jest is over, and the tale hath had its effect.
- Jonathan Swift2
INTRODUCTION
"My economic agenda can be summed up in three very beautiful words.
Jobs. Jobs. Jobs. We have to bring our jobs back .... Excessive regulation costs
our economy two trillion dollars a year. Can you believe that? Two trillion
dollars per year!" 3 Thus spoke Candidate Trump in Toledo, Ohio in September
2016, as he promised to roll back regulations if elected.
He is making good on that pledge. On January 30, 2017, newly elected
President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 13,771, decreeing that
agencies must repeal two rules for every new rule they issue, and completely
offset the costs of any new rule with cost savings from repealed requirements-
a radical experiment never before tried in the United States.4 A few days later
President Trump issued Executive Order 13,777 ordering each and every
Executive Branch agency to establish both a Regulatory Reform Task Force and
a process to identify rules to be repealed.5 In 2017, sixty-seven regulatory
1. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
383 (1936).
2. Jonathan Swift, The Examiner No. X1V(November 9th, 1710) (quoted in Dana Milbank, The
Truth Comes Limping After, WASH. POST, Feb. 11,2018, at A21).
3. DONALD J. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP CAMPAIGN RALLY IN TOLEDO, OHIO (Sept. 21, 2016),
available online at https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4785991/trumps-2-trillion-regcost-claim
[https://perma.cc/A8YH-H7W7].
4. Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, Exec. Order No. 13,771 § 2, 82 Fed.
Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017), available online at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/201 7 -
02451.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM35-EBNX] [hereinafter EO 13,771] ("Unless prohibited by law,
whenever an executive department or agency ... publicly proposes ... or otherwise promulgates a new
regulation, it shall identify at least two existing regulations to be repealed.") It also establishes a regulatory
budget of "zero" for FY 2017, meaning that all costs of any new regulation issued by executive branch
agencies must be offset by "the elimination of existing costs associated with at least two prior regulations."
§ 2(c). For ensuing years, the Order decrees that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will dictate
to each agency the "total amount of incremental costs" that it may impose on society with rules issued in
that fiscal year. § 3(d). That increment may be zero, greater than zero, or less than zero (meaning net
deregulation in that year). Id. Subject agencies are prohibited from issuing rules expected to impose costs
in excess of their regulatory cost quota, unless expressly required by law. Id.
5" Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda, Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12285 (Mar.
1, 2017), available online at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/01/2017-04107/
enforcing-the-regulatory-reform-agenda [https://perma.cc/QF7P-244U] [hereinafter EO 13,777].
2018]
ECOLOGY LA W QUARTERLY [Vol. 45:845
requirements proposed or recently finalized by the Obama Administration were
withdrawn or reversed by Congress or the Trump Administration. 6 In Fiscal Year
2018, the Trump Administration claimed 176 deregulatory actions of which
fifty-seven were deemed significant, compared to only fourteen new regulatory
actions. 7 The pace of new rule issuance has slowed to a crawl,8 while
enforcement of existing rules is being defunded and de-emphasized. 9 Congress,
6 Speaking on camera beside several tall stacks of paper, President Trump recently claimed,
"[w]ithin our first 11 months, we cancelled or delayed over 1,500 planned regulatory actions-more than
any previous President by far ... And instead of eliminating two old regulations, for every one new
regulation we have eliminated 22." Pres. Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on Deregulation
(Dec. 14, 2017), transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trump-deregulation/ [https://perma.cc/MWG4-QBDP]. The ratio of twenty-two comes from
dividing sixty-seven deregulatory actions by the three new regulatory actions finalized during the period.
See OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY REFORM: COMPLETED ACTIONS FISCAL
YEAR 2017 (last visited Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaEO13771
[https://perma.cc/4AJU-JJE4]. President Trump appears to have exaggerated a bit. Bloomberg reporters
have disclosed that "[a]t least 22 of the 67 deregulatory actions.., were adapted from efforts begun under
Obama, often with little or no change." See Alan Levin & Ari Natter, Trump Stretches Meaning of
Deregulation in Touting Achievements, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 29, 2017)
https ://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-1 2-29/trump-stretches-meaning-of-deregulation-in-
touting-achievements. [https://perma.cc/447E-LUBP]. Moreover, they found that only 469 draft
regulations had been "withdrawn." Of these, 42 percent (or 197 rules) had already been effectively killed
in the Obama Administration. See Alan Levin & Jesse Hamilton, Trump Takes Creditfor KillingHundreds
of Regulations That Were Already Dead, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 11, 2017)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-12-1 1/trump-takes-credit-for-killing-hundreds-of-
regulations-that-were-already-dead. [https://perma.cc/K5G7-6STM]. What these claims of Trump
Administration exaggeration overlook, however, is that repealing forty-three rules (sixty-seven minus
twenty-two) and withdrawing 272 draft rules in the pipeline (469 minus 197) is still a potentially
significant achievement. Moreover, it is not the number of repealed or withdrawn rules, but the magnitude
of their foregone costs and benefits that matter most to regulatory policy. On this score the sixteen major
rules repealed by Congressional Review Act plus the repeal of the Clean Power Plan-and nothing else-
would constitute a signal accomplishment for year one. To this must be added the impact of additional
repeals likely to follow in later years.
7. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY
REFORM REPORT: COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018, https://www.reginfo.gov
/public/pdf/eo13771/EO_13771 CompletedActions for Fiscal-Year 2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y3NV-AMHV]. For an interactive overview of 145 major deregulatory actions begun, in-process, or
completed during the first two years of the Trump Presidency see BROOKINGS, TRACKING DEREGULATION
IN THE TRUMP ERA (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/tracking-deregulation-in-the-trump-
era/ [https://perma.cc/4VAX-7RCU]. For a conservative take on these developments, see Dan Bosch &
Dan Goldbeck, 2018. The Year in Regulation, AMERICAN ACTION FORUM (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/2018-the-year-in-regulation/ (celebrating $7.8 billion in
regulatory cost savings expected to result from Trump Administration regulations and deregulations in
2018, without mention of the lost regulatory benefits for human health, safety, or the environment.).
8. The October 2017 Unified Agenda of Federal Regulation reveals that the number of rules at all
stages of issuance (pre-rule, proposed, and final) in 2017 was less than half the 2016 level. OFFICE OF
INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, CURRENT UNIFIED AGENDA OF REGULATORY AND DEREGULATORY
ACTIONS (Fall 2017), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain?operation=OPERATION
-GET AGENCY RULE _LIST&currentPub--true&agencyCode=&showStage=active&agencyCd=0000
&Image58.x=62&Image58.y-26 [https://perma.cc/ZV4G-N87E] (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).
9 See, e.g., Memorandum from Susan Shinkman, Director, EPA Office of Enft and Compliance
Assurance, on Interim Procedures for Issuing Information Requests Pursuant to Clean Air Act § 114,
Clean Water Act § 308, and RCRA § 3007 to Regional Counsel, Regional Enforcement Directors,
Regional Enforcement Coordinators, OCE Division Directors (May 31, 2017) (available at
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meanwhile, has repealed sixteen major Obama era rules under the Congressional
Review Act, along with the health, safety, and environmental protections the
rules would have afforded the American people.10 Congress is considering a raft
of new legislative proposals that, if enacted, would virtually paralyze federal
agency efforts to issue new rules.1'
Like President Trump, critics of regulation in Congress have predicated
their regulatory rollback initiatives on the belief that regulations are costing the
economy $2 trillion per year. House Concurrent Resolution 125, a hitherto
obscure resolution enacted in the summer of 2016 prior to the election of Donald
Trump is, in retrospect, an important bellwether document that merits closer
attention:
"(a) Findings.-The House finds the following:
(1) Excessive Federal regulation-
(A) has hurt job creation, investment, wages, competition, and economic
growth, slowing the Nation's recovery from the economic recession and
harming American households;
(3) The estimated cost of Federal regulations are as high as $1.88 to $2.03
trillion per year." 12
The resolution went on to propose a deregulatory "reform" agenda that
foreshadows the regulatory rollback bills mentioned above. 13
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4324892-EPA-Clean-Air-Act-and-Its-Power-to-Request
.html#document/p60/a392202 [https://perma.cc/YPF2-PJB5]) (removing the authority of EPA
enforcement officers in regional offices to independently order air and water pollution tests and gather
other information relevant to compliance without permission from Washington); Eric Lipton & Danielle
Ivory, Under Trump, E.P.A. Has Slowed Actions Against Polluters, and Put Limits on Enforcement
Officers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/10/us/politics/pollution-epa-
regulations.html (reporting that "[d]uring 266 days under its administrator, Scott Pruitt, the agency has
filed about a thousand fewer cases and sought almost $9 billion less in those cases, including
environmental repairs and fines, than during the same period in the Obama Administration").
10. Congressional Review Act: The Case for Repeal, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM,
http://www.progressivereform.org/CRA-numbers.cfin#CRANumbers (last visited Jan. 7, 2019) (listing
and providing links to repealed rules).
11. Among the bills pending before the last Congress were proposals to impose a congressionally-
mandated regulatory budget, H.R. 2623, 115th Cong. (2017), require formal rulemaking, H.R. 5, 115th
Cong. § 103 (2017), require affirmative congressional approval of every major rule before it can take
effect, H.R. 26, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017), require retrospective cost-benefit review of rules every five years
(with no additional resources), H.R. 5, 115th Cong. § 103 (2017), and/or statutorily reverse the judge-
made Chevron doctrine, which calls for judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutory provisions, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. § 202 (2017).
12 H.R. REP.NO. 114-470, at315 (2016).
13" Id. at 316-17 ("(b) Policy on Federal Regulatory Budgeting and Reform.-It is the policy of
this concurrent resolution that the House should, in consultation with the public, consider legislation
that... (3) requires-"(A) an annual, congressional regulatory budget that establishes annual costs of
regulations and allocates these costs amongst Federal regulatory agencies; "(3) cost-benefit and regulatory
impact analysis for new regulations proposed and promulgated by all Federal regulatory agencies; "(C)
advance notice of proposed rulemaking and makes evidentiary hearings available for critical disputed
issues in the development of new major regulations; "(D) congressional approval of all new major
regulations before the regulations can become effective, ensuring that Congress can better prevent the
2018]
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What is driving this regulatory rollback movement? While some of the
backers of the movement may be cynical rent-seekers, there is no reason to doubt
that many proponents of such reforms genuinely believe that the regulatory state
has run amok, that it is imposing huge costs-upwards of $2 trillion per year-
on the American economy, and that those horrendous costs are making America
uncompetitive and killing jobs.
Where does this seminal belief-that federal regulations are costing the
economy between $1.88 and $2.03 trillion per year-come from? House
Concurrent Resolution 125 offers no citations, but we can trace the provenance
of its numbers through the numerical fingerprints supplied by the Resolution's
use of three significant digits in presenting its findings. The upper-bound $2.03
trillion figure almost certainly comes from a 2014 study for the National
Association of Manufacturers by W. Mark Crain and Nicole Crain, which offered
an estimate of $2.028 trillion.14 The lower bound of $1.88 trillion in the
concurrent resolution almost certainly derives from an estimate of $1.885 trillion
in Ten Thousand Commandments (2016), an Annual Report by Clyde Wayne
Crews, Jr.15
These studies, like predecessor studies by the same authors, have received
wide and credulous circulation in the media and in numerous congressional
hearings.' 6 It seems fair to conclude that their main conclusions are widely
accepted. Yet, remarkably, while external scholars have thoroughly reviewed
and debunked an earlier (2010) study by the Crains, 17 Crews's Tip of the
imposition of unsound costly new regulations; and "(E) post-implementation cost-benefit analysis of all
new major regulations on at least a decennial basis, to ensure that regulations operate as intended and
impose no more costs than necessary."').
14. W. MARK CRAIN & NICOLE V. CRAIN, THE COST OF FEDERAL REGULATION TO THE U.S.
ECONOMY, MANUFACTURING AND SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT FOR THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS I (Sept. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Crain (2014)].
15" CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF
THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 2 (2016) [hereinafter Crews, Commandments (2016)].
16. A recent Lexis search revealed that the Crain (2014) study has been cited in at least twenty-one
separate congressional hearings, committee reports and/or floor debates. Its 2010 predecessor, which used
similar methods to reach similar conclusions, was cited in twenty congressional hearings, while the Crews
study was cited at least nine times before Congress. The full list of congressional testimony and media
citations in the public literature is available on demand from the author. One can only imagine how many
times the statistic featured in unpublished speeches, and trade association letters to members (the 2014
Crain study was sponsored by the National Association of Manufacturers). Of course the most important
evidence of these studies' impact is the official use of their numbers by congressional leadership and the
President. See supra notes 3 and 13 and accompanying text.
17. See Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The $1.75 Trillion Lie, I MICH. J. ENV'T & ADMFN.
L. 127, 150 (2012) [hereinafter, Heinzerling & Ackerman (2012)]; Sidney A. Shapiro et al., Setting the
Record Straight: The Crain Report on Regulatory Costs (Center for Progressive Reform White Paper
#1 103,Feb. 2011) at 2-3 [hereinafter Shapiro (2011)]; CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41763, ANALYSIS OF AN ESTIMATE OF THE TOTAL COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 12,23 (Apr. 6,
2011) [hereinafter CRS (2011)]; MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R44348, METHODS OF
ESTIMATING THE TOTAL COST OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (Jan. 21, 2016) [hereinafter CRS (2016)].
[Vol. 45:845
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Costberg study has not been reviewed at all, and the 2014 Crain and Crain study
has not been closely examined.1 8
This Article fills that void by offering a detailed assessment of the two main
empirical studies whose sensational findings are now fueling the regulatory
rollback movement. The most common and obvious rejoinder to these regulatory
cost estimates-and to the regulatory rollback movement generally-has been
that such estimates ignore the benefits of regulation. 19 Common sense tells us
that one cannot rationally judge the value of any good or service (public or
private) without weighing costs against benefits of the thing being evaluated.
Moreover, for over forty years the federal government has required a Regulatory
Impact Assessment, which accomplishes that cost-benefit balancing for most
major rules issued by executive branch agencies.2 0 The fundamental objection
that cost-only estimates ignore benefits is clearly valid, but it has been well-made
by others and will not be explored further here.2 1 The focus of this Article is on
whether even the cost estimates can be trusted.
Part I will examine the provenance of these seminal studies: i.e., the
scholarly bona fides of the authors, their financial and/or contractual
independence, and the credibility of the venue in which they published their
results. It turns out that both studies were sponsored by organizations with a
strong financial and organizational stake in the outcome of the studies. Neither
study was peer reviewed. In fact, neither study was even published in an external
journal that might have provided an external filter for quality or veracity. The
2014 Crain and Crain study was a successor to a 2010 report by the same authors
that was panned by academic critics, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), and the Congressional Research Service, and dismissed as "deeply
18. Remarkably, despite the inaccuracies of their 2010 study, the Crains received a new research
contract from the Small Business Administration (SBA) on September 21, 2017 for yet another study of
the same topic. Letter from Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on Small Bus. &
Entrepreneurship, & Sen. Heidi Heitkamp, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on Small Bus. &
Entrepreneurship, to Major L. Clark I1, Chief Counsel, Office of Advocacy, Small Bus. Admin. (Dec. 22,
2017) (available at https://perma.cc/VVV5-4MXW). In response, the ranking members of two
subcommittees of the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship sent a letter to the Chief
Counsel of the SBA's Office of Advocacy inquiring about the protocols that allowed the Crams to receive
another research contract. Id. The senators who authored the letter were particularly concerned about this
contract because the 2010 Crain study was faulted for "using unreliable methodology and flawed data,"
which resulted in an "erroneous and overstated cost estimate." Id. The senators also noted that the 2014
study was similarly critiqued and, when challenged, the Office of Advocacy was unable to substantiate its
findings. Id. Under pressure, SBA cancelled the Crain contract in May 2018. See Cheryl Bolen, Small
Business Office Ends Controversial Consultants' Contract, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 24, 2018.
19 See, e.g., Complaint at 4-5, Public Citizen, Inc. v. Trump, No. 1: 17-cv-00253 (D.D.C. Feb.
8, 2017); Shapiro (2011), supra note 17, at 2 3.
20. CRS (2011), supra note 17. See Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17,
1981), available online at https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order
/12291.html [https://perma.cc/BS9G-BL7Y] [hereinafter EO 12,2911; Regulatory Planning and Review,
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993), available online at
https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.html [https://perma.cc/2EAD
-C6GJ] [hereinafter EO 12866].
21. See sources cited supra note 17.
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flawed" by the Administrator of Office of Management and Budget's (OMB)
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).
Part II will examine the transparency and reproducibility of these studies
and supporting documentation. The Crains have refused to disclose their source
data, a refusal that in itself should have raised serious questions about the study's
methods. Efforts by this author (working with a trained statistician) to reproduce
their regression analysis using publicly available data from the sources they say
they used, using their stated methods of calculation, produces a regulatory cost
estimate that is $500 billion lower than theirs. Crews, by contrast, has abundantly
documented his immediate sources, with hundreds of footnotes. But his citations
are not probative for reasons that will become manifest in Part Ill: his immediate
sources often simply snatch a number without validation from earlier sources,
which cite still prior sources, again without validation, and so on. The original
source, once unearthed, often turns out to be decades old and/or lacking in
credibility itself.
Part Ill will examine the methodology employed in the Crain and Crews
studies, respectively, to assess the cost of four separate types of "regulation"
covered by those reports: economic regulation, social regulation, tax compliance
(including time spent preparing tax returns), and homeland security (including
time spent waiting in line in airport security).
Part IlI.A will examine the methods used by the Crains, and by Crews, to
estimate the cost of "economic regulation." The Crains derive nearly $1.5 trillion
in estimated "costs of economic regulation" (over 70 percent of their $1.9 trillion
estimate) from a statistical regression of per capita Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) against a self-styled "Economic Regulation Index" drawn from an
opinion poll of business executives in thirty-four Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. This unlikely approach
yielded regression results that proved impossible for this author to replicate with
public data from the sources cited by the Crains. Moreover, their regression
model lacks theoretical foundation and seems to have little to recommend it
beyond the fact that it allegedly produced a statistical fit.22
How were the Crains able to generate large and "highly significant"
statistical results with an invalid proxy and a nonsense regression equation?
Subpart A. 1 of Part II will explain this paradox in simple layman's terms. It
turns out to be rather easy to produce "statistically significant" coefficients in a
regression if one uses flawed methods. Indeed, the same regression model and
data that the Crains used (substituting only the main variable of interest) can be
used to demonstrate that the comparative lack of judicial independence in the
United States "costs" the U.S. economy $1.5 trillion per year; that a dearth of
22. The Crams' refusal to release their source data made exact reproduction of their results
impossible. However, since their ERA and control variables are based on public data, we were able to
construct our own data set and run their regression using publicly-sourced data for the variable in their
equation. See discussion infra at Part IIl.A.l and Annex. The exact number, however, is less important
than the validity of their methodology discussed in Part IlI.A..
[Vol. 45:845
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trust in politicians costs $1.9 trillion; and that government favoritism costs $1.1
trillion.
The ease with which regression analysis can produce "statistically
significant" yet bogus findings makes external validation by neutral experts
particularly important where such techniques are used to generate findings on
which major policy decisions will be based. No such validation occurred in this
case.
Subpart A.2 of Part HI will examine the methodology used by Clyde Wayne
Crews in Ten Thousand Commandments and Tip of the Costberg to estimate the
cost of "economic" regulations as he defines that term. Crews's numbers are
supplied by a simple technique that he uses with telling effect throughout his
study. That technique can best be described as snatching a number from a prior
study without validating its credibility and continued relevance to the current
environment. For economy of words, we will refer to this practice simply as
"number snatching."
Crews's method for generating his $400 billion estimate for the cost of
economic regulation offers a fine illustration of number snatching and its pitfalls.
Crews lifts a number without analysis from a 2001 study by Crain and Hopkins,
which lifts a number without analysis from a 1999 OECD report, which cites a
1997 OECD report, which derives its number without analysis from a 1995
Council on Economic Advisor's report, which estimated the costs of the then-
existing regulatory regime for telecommunications in support of a
telecommunications deregulatory bill that passed in 1996, thereby mooting the
entire estimate. The only alteration to any number along this number-snatching
chain is a three-fold multiplication of cost applied by Crain and Hopkins in 2001
to account for "transfer costs," a practice that also turns out to be taken out of
context and is unjustified in the context of an estimate of costs to GDP.
Subpart B of Part III will turn to an examination of the methodology that
both the Crain and Crews studies use to estimate costs of "social regulations,"
i.e., health, safety, and environmental regulations enacted by executive branch
agencies. Both studies use similar sources and methods to derive their respective
numbers for social regulations, so we will examine them together. Within this
category the Crains tally only Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) regulations to yield an
estimate of $401 billion per year, while Crews sweeps more broadly to include
other agency regulatory costs summing to $904 billion a year. Due to space
limitations, the discussion will focus on the sources and methods used to estimate
costs of the regulatory categories that the Crain and Crews studies both cover:
(1) occupational safety and health regulations and (2) environmental regulations.
Here, once again, we find number snatching at work, this time practiced by
both the Crain and Crews studies. Subpart B. 1 will show that 99 percent of the
$71 billion in occupational safety and health regulatory costs estimated in the
Crain and Crain study and 45 percent of the counterpart costs in the broader
Crews compilation are accounted for by a single, Mercatus Center-funded study
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that involves inflating OMB-reported agency-generated cost estimates by a
factor of 5.5. That multiplier is itself lifted without critical scrutiny from a prior,
unpublished working paper that employs an arbitrary assumption to reach an
unsupported conclusion.
Subpart B.2 of Part III will report the results of a similar audit of the
environmental regulatory cost estimates in the Crain and Crews studies. Once
again we see number snatching in action. In this case, the number in question is
taken from a 1991 study of pre-1988 environmental regulations, which drew its
number from an earlier general equilibrium modeling exercise that has since been
thoroughly examined and debunked by outside scholars (though that did not stop
either Crews or the Crains from using the discredited number again in their most
recent studies).
One might expect to find firmer methodological footing in the seemingly
benign practice of simply adding up agency estimates of the cost of new
regulations issued each year--estimates which OMB has tallied on an annual
basis since 1995 and reported in its Annual Report to Congress on the Costs and
Benefits of Federal Regulations. Even this practice, it turns out, is fraught with
methodological peril. The figures that enter into each OMB annual report are ex
ante estimates, not ex post measures of actual cost. Moreover, the newly
promulgated rules listed in OMB reports each year are not always implemented
exactly as planned. Such rules may be later withdrawn by agencies, overturned
by courts, modified by subsequent rules, clarified by guidance, or softened by
waivers and variances granted after the fact or by enforcement policy or neglect.
Tabulating ex ante regulatory cost predictions snatched from old OMB reports
without checking to see whether the rules tallied in those reports have been
overturned, withdrawn, modified, clarified, or enforced turns out to be just
another instance of misleading number snatching. Studies have shown that tens
of billions of dollars in phantom costs can be generated in this manner. 23
Subpart C of Part III will conclude the methodological discussion with an
examination of the sources and methods that both the Crain and Crews studies
used to project enormous estimated costs of tax compliance and homeland
security, respectively. It turns out that most of these costs are of questionable
relevance to the contemporary debate over regulation, and appear to be greatly
exaggerated in any case.
Part V will show that the "aggregate cost of regulation" is unknown,
unknowable, and unnecessary to sound regulatory policy. In fact, OIRA came to
this realization and abandoned the quest to develop such a number over a decade
ago. Yet the most powerful leaders of our country continue to imbibe, and act
upon, these imaginary numbers as if they were somehow real.
Part V will step back to look at the larger picture in search of an answer to
the overarching question posed by the Crain and Crews studies and the galaxy of
similar studies that they inhabit: what is driving the proliferation and credulous
23. Heinzerling & Ackerman (2012), supra note 17, at 155. See also discussion infra Part 111.B.3.
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reception of a raft of studies that focus exclusively on cost with little or no regard
for the benefits of regulation, or even an accurate estimation of cost? This Part
will suggest that a plausible explanation may be found in a coalition of(a) major
business lobbies such the Chamber of Commerce and National Association of
Manufacturers who understandably want to minimize regulatory cost and
nuisance for business, with (b) very wealthy and ideologically driven donors (led
by the Koch brothers) who hold strongly libertarian views and who have founded
and funded a bevy of think tanks and advocacy centers aimed at reshaping public
policy to reflect their libertarian viewpoint. It would appear that the
"scholarship" produced by this movement is not primarily fact-driven. It is
agenda-driven. Conservatives and libertarians may argue that liberal proponents
of regulation play the same game on the other side, and there may be some truth
to such claims. But, if so, that situation simply exacerbates the dilemma facing
Congress, the White House, agencies, and the media (a dilemma highlighted but
not resolved by this Article): how does one ensure the truthfulness, the reliability,
and the credibility of the information and analysis on which major public policy
decisions are made?
I. THE DuBious PROVENANCE OF THE CRAIN AND CREWS STUDIES
This Part will examine what I will call the "provenance" of the Crain and
Crews studies from which the House of Representatives drew its regulatory costs
in House Concurrent Resolution 125. The provenance criterion offers a simple
and useful screening tool that journalists, editorial writers, and congressional
staff might have applied in assessing the credibility of these analyses, by asking
the following simple questions: (1) Was the authors' work published in a
credible journal? Was it otherwise peer reviewed or quality-controlled by an
external party under an arrangement that requires that errors identified by
reviewers be corrected? (2) Are the authors financially and/or contractually
independent, in the sense that they do not receive funding from interests who
have a stake in the outcome? (3) Have the authors done reputable work in the
past?
This Part will show that the provenance criterion alone should have raised
red flags about both studies.
A. Crain & Crain (2014)
The 2014 Crain and Crain study has never been published in an outside
journal, nor was it ever peer reviewed. It was written under contract to a client,
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), which obviously has a strong
institutional interest in the outcome of the study.24 Moreover, the 2014 study
24. See Crain (2014), supra note 14. The NAM website reports that the Board of Directors of NAM
"comprises more than 200 of the nation's top manufacturing executives representing large and small
companies alike across all industrial sectors." See http://www.nam.org/About/Board-of-Directors/. These
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follows closely (with slightly different data and methods) a 2010 study of
regulatory costs by the same authors. The predecessor study likewise was not
externally published, received only perfunctory peer review, and was heavily
criticized for shoddy methods. Indeed, GAO chastised the Small Business
Administration's (SBA's) Office of Advocacy, which commissioned the 2010
study, for failing to secure meaningful peer review for that and other studies.2 5
In 2012, a published study by Heinzerling and Ackerman, The $1.75 Trillion Lie,
devoted thirty-two pages to exposing fundamental flaws in the methodology of
the 2010 Crain and Crain study.26 Several other studies, including two by
scholars at the Congressional Research Service, also raised serious doubts about
the study's methodology.2 7 Cass Sunstein, a renowned scholar and then-
Administrator of OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
dismissed the study in congressional testimony as an "urban legend" while the
SBA distanced itself from the study on its website.28
Such criticisms did not come in time to stop the 2010 Crain and Crain study
and its sensational $1.75 trillion regulatory cost claim from being widely and
are, obviously, all regulate4 entities who thus bear the cost of regulations. NAM directly cites the Crain
(2014) study on their website as one of their "Top 20 Facts About Manufacturing." Top 20 Facts About
Manufacturing, (July 28, 2018), http://www.nam.org/Newsroom/Facts-About-Manufacturing/. NAM's
website also features and links to the study on a page titled "The Cost of Federal Regulation." The Cost
of Federal Regulation, (July 28, 2018), http://www.nam.org/Data-and-Reports/Reports/Cost-of-Federal-
Regulations/The-Cost-of-Federal-Regulation/ and on its page devoted to "Regulatory Reform." See
http ://www.nam.org/Issues/Regulatory-Reform/.
25. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION: OFFICE OF
ADVOCACY NEEDS TO IMPROVE CONTROLS OVER RESEARCH, REGULATORY AND WORKFORCE PLANNING
ACTIVITIES: REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES AND GENERAL
GOVERNMENT, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, US SENATE 13 (July 2014) [hereinafter 2014 GAO
Report on SBA]. ("[Advocacy] does not have policies and procedures that reflect the federal information
quality guidelines on retaining data for influential studies or taking other steps to substantiate the quality
of information in such studies when they have not retained the data.") The GAO also reported in 2014 that
Advocacy's contracts for external research during this period did not even contain a clause requiring the
researcher to make significant changes to correct significant deficiencies since that might "result in
expanding the scope of the research." Id. at 12. Unlike its 2014 successor, the 2010 Crain study was "peer
reviewed" by two reviewers. The first raised major concerns about the study's methodology that were
ignored in the published version. The other "peer reviewer," Robert Litan, a respected scholar at the
conservative American Enterprise Institute, offered two sentences: "I looked it over and it's terrific,
nothing to add. Congrats." See Shapiro (2011), supra note 17, at 3. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, SMALL
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, INFORMATION QUALITY PEER REVIEW REPORT FOR THE IMPACT OF
FEDERAL REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS 4 (2010), available at http://www.sba.gov
/sites/default/files/files/ThelmpactofFederalRegulatoryCostsonSmallFirmsPRFY20I 0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T3F3-QMU3].
26. See Heinzerling & Ackerman (2012), supra note 17, at 127-38. For additional critiques of the
2010 Crain study, see also Shapiro (2011), supra note 17; CRS (2011), supra note 17; and CRS (2016),
supra note 17.
27. CRS (2011), supra note 17, at 1-2; CRS (2016), supra note 17, at 15-17; see also Shapiro
(2011), supra note 17, at 3.
28. Eliminating Job-Sapping Federal Rules Through Retrospective Reviews--Oversight of the
President's Efforts. Hearing Before the Comm. on Small Bus., 112th Cong. 12 (2011) (statement of Cass
Sunstein, Administrator, Office of Info. and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Mgmt. & Budget).
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credulously cited in the news media and in congressional testimony. 29 But these
criticisms should have raised questions among Members of Congress and their
staff about the reliability of later and similar studies by these same authors.
B. Crews (2017)
The $1.88 trillion annual cost figure featured in Ten Thousand
Commandments is derived from the 2016 edition of Tip of the Costberg: On the
Invalidity of All Cost of Regulation Estimates and the Need to Compile Them
Anyway, which Crews also updates and issues annually. 30 Again, both are self-
published works that, as such, have not been subject to peer review or any other
type of external publication filter. The author, Wayne Crews, is a vice president
at Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI), which announces itself (and is
celebrated by others) as a zealous advocacy organization dedicated to opposing
regulation and government intervention in the economy generally.3 1 Costberg
does not purport to be a scholarly analysis. It is a 140-page polemic that unfolds
in sixteen chapters, each of which is prefaced by occasionally witty and often
insulting quotes attesting to the evil or folly of government. 32 It offers barely a
mention of the benefits of regulation and then only to discount them.33 In
Principia Bureaucratica, the online spreadsheet that supplies the tabulation of
the numbers that appear in Costberg and Ten Thousand Commandments, Crews
frankly declares that all of his estimates are "subject to change at author's
discretion." 34 This is noteworthy because facts-and fact-based estimates-
29. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
30. Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Tip of the Costberg: On the Invalidity of All Cost of Regulation
Estimates and the Need to Compile Them Anyway (Jan. 8, 2017) (Working Paper) (available on Social
Science Research Network (SSRN). [hereinafter, Crews, Costberg (2017)].
31. See, e.g., CEI's 2015-2016 Annual Report boasting of endorsements. (Fortune: "While many
on the right are lying low while the free market implodes, the Competitive Enterprise Institute isn't
backing down, fighting on fronts from the bailout to green energy." The Business Insider: "CEI's Myron
Ebell may be enemy #1 to the current climate change community." Steve Forbes: "Over its 25-year history,
CEI has played a critical role in preventing the worst of the left's utopian nightmares from becoming
reality, and in undoing some of the damage those policies have created." Ron Paul: "CEI is a true asset to
the freedom movement, on issues from global warming to financial regulation, I can always count on CEI
to effectively make a principled case for liberty." Al Gore on CEI (lamenting): "... over 20 years, I have
seen them have a tremendous effect.").
32. For example, Crews writes, "'I have tried to present a factual-data-filled, at any rate-account
of how this govemment works. Which is complicated by the fact that it doesn't.' -P. J. O'Rourke,
Parliament of Whores." Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 12. "'I never determined how many
sections there really are to the federal system. It probably can't be done. Government is not a machine
with parts: it's an organism. When does an intestine quit being an intestine and start becoming an
asshole?'- P. J. O'Rourke, Parliament of Whores." Id at 43. He further writes, "'I was never molested
by any person but those who represented the state.' -Thoreau." Id.
33. See Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 15 (claiming that consideration of regulatory
benefits is merely a pretext for an "ever expanding government").
34. Principia Bureaucratica: A Placeholder for the Total Annual Cost of Federal Regulation and
Intervention, reprinted herein as Appendix B and available online at https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets
/d/1 R419caJsjzCrUr8SwGo 3nuj5-1nBLUvFl 8iSkqJF 0/pub?output-html [https://perma.cc/A9M2-
R823] [hereinafter Principia Bureaucratica].
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obviously are not subject to change at an author's discretion. This candid caveat
does not, of course, appear in Crews's testimony or media mentions of his
findings, but it is there in this background document nonetheless, and it is
revealing.
H. THE NON-TRANSPARENCY AND NON-REPRODUCIBWLITY OF THE CRAIN AND
CREWS STUDIES
The reproducibility criterion, in a nutshell, asks whether the underlying
sources and data of the study have been published or made available to outside
scholars.3 5 Experiments and findings that are not reproducible, or for which
source data are concealed, should be deemed presumptively not credible unless
there is good reason for non-reproducibility in that case, such as individual
privacy requirements or the nature of the study itself.36 This Part will expose
major issues with both studies when judged by this criterion.
A. Crain & Crain
The Crains have refused to publish or share the data supporting their 2014
study, despite numerous requests from this author. In so doing they follow the
course they adopted with their 2010 study, in which they refused to divulge their
study data even to the GAO.37 Their refusal to disclose their underlying data and
analysis to support reproduction efforts violates professional norms and is not
explained or excused by any cited proprietary or privacy interest.
The Crains did publish the regression equation they used to estimate the
cost of "economic" regulation, and the variables that appear in that equation can
be supplied with data available from the public sources they said they used.38
Working with a trained statistician this author therefore attempted to replicate
their regression. The results of that effort are reported in the Annex to this
Article. Drawing on published data sets that clearly are not identical to the
Crains' data set, but are broadly similar (as indicated by a comparison of mean,
standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values for each variable)39 to
supply values for variables in the Crains' regression equation yielded a
regression coefficient that is statistically significant. It corresponds to an
35. Francis S. Collins & Lawrence A. Tabak, NIH Plans to Enhance Reproducibility, 505 NATURE
612, 612 (2014) (noting that science "is founded on the replication of earlier work" and that reproducibility
is the foundation of the "checks and balances that ensure scientific fidelity").
36. Sometimes the nature of the inquiry inherently precludes reproducibility: to cite an extreme
example, one cannot validate the results of a study of the effects of nuclear explosions on human health
based on data from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings without dropping another nuclear bomb on
another very similar city.
37. 2014 GAO Report on SBA, supra note 25, at 14-15.
38. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 31-32.
39. See Annex Table 1 and Table 2.
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"economic regulatory cost" figure that is about 64 percent of the figure the Crains
propose. 40
Thirty-six percent is a large discrepancy-it implies a regulatory cost that
is $500 billion per year less than the Crains' estimate. Nonetheless, the
reproduction effort did yield a statistically significant regression coefficient and
the results are sufficiently similar to the Crains' results that we cannot reject with
confidence the hypothesis that they ran the regression they say they ran, using
data obtained from somewhere, and that they somehow obtained the results they
report. The larger question explored in Part III is whether their methodology is
sound, and their results meaningful.
B. Crews
Crews, unlike the Crains, does explain the derivation of his numbers in
considerable detail. He even offers an online spreadsheet, entitled Principia
Bureaucratica: A Placeholder for the Total Annual Cost of Federal Regulation
and Intervention which supplies his specific numerical tallies by category and
sub-category. 4 1 Costberg is also supported by 628 endnotes to his various
sources.
42
Inspection reveals, however, that 70 percent of his total $1.902 trillion cost
estimate ($1.344 trillion) is accounted for by "Crews mods and supplements." 43
Crews calls these numbers "mods and supplements" to distinguish them from
figures drawn from what he claims are OMB sources that presumably offer a
firmer foundation for estimation. However, our audit of the largest categories of
Crews's costs will reveal a disconcerting pattern and practice: Crews's numbers
tend to be extracted from prior sources, which often derive the numbers from still
older sources, and so on until the ultimate origin of the numbers has become
opaque to the point of near invisibility.44 This "Russian doll" citation pattern
occludes the source, the vintage, and the credibility of the original numbers.
When one finally arrives at the original source (the innermost "doll"), one finds
an original study that may or may not be credible and may be decades-old and
irrelevant to the modem regulatory environment. This pattern will emerge
clearly from the discussion of methodology that follows.
40. This regression result is displayed in the third column of Table 3 in the Annex.
41 Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34, at row 171.
42 Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 143-70.
43. Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34, at row 167.
44- See discussion infra Part II.B. Though Crews does not offer or discuss source-study selection
criteria, the discussion that follows will reveal that Crews exhibits a clear preference for studies by authors
at the Mercatus Center or other right-leaning centers, and by a group of repeat contributors to the anti-
government-regulation literature: e.g., Mark and Nicole Crain, Jerry Ellig, Thomas Hopkins, Robert Hahn,
Michael Hazilla, Joseph Johnson, Raymond, Kopp.
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III. THE FLAWED METHODOLOGY OF THE CRAIN AND CREWS STUDIES
Neither the Crain nor Crews studies attempt to measure costs by simply
adding up the measured cost of individual regulations enacted over the years.
This is impossible, as the Crains explain, because no comprehensive tabulation
of the costs of federal regulations exists. 45 The OMB's Annual Report on the
Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations estimates costs and benefits only for
"significant" rules issued by executive branch agencies over the past ten years.46
It does not capture the costs of older rules, smaller rules, rules issued by
independent agencies, or guidance documents which may have the effect of
imposing significant costs informally. Also, agencies typically measure only
direct compliance costs, not indirect costs. 47 Most of all, the estimates are ex ante
predictions generated by regulatory agencies during the rulemaking process, not
validated ex post measurements. 48
To fill the void left by the absence of hard data on the measured cost of
regulation, Crain and Crews employ a variety of speculative strategies to
estimate costs of a potpourri of government interventions that they lump together
under the loose rubric of "regulation." Table 1 compares the estimates reached
by the Crains and Crews for each of these categories of regulation:
45 Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 4-6.
46. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2015 REP. TO CONG. ON THE
BENEFITS & COSTS OF FED. REG. & AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM
ACT I n.4 (2015). As seen below, OMB reports prior to 2002 used to look back more than ten years, and
both Crain and Crews rely on these old reports for estimates of older rules, even though OMB's position
since 2002 has been that such estimates are unreliable. See Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 29-
31; see also discussion in Part IV infra.
47. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 15-16, 27; Crews, Commandments (2016), supra note 15, at 9
10.
48. See Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 3 6.
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Table 1
The Cost of Federal Regulation: Comparison of Crain and Crews
Estimates (billions of current dollars)
Type of Regulation Crain (2014)49 Crews (2017)50
All Federal Regulations $ 2028 $ 1902
"Economic" Regulations $ 1448 $ 402
"Social" (Health, Safety, and $401 $922
Environmental) Regulations
Tax Compliance Costs $159 $ 316
Homeland Security Costs $ 21 $ 57
Independent Agency Costs No separate estimate $ 205
Table 1 shows that the Crains and Crews end up with nearly the same total
estimated cost, even though their estimates for the individual components of that
total are radically different. The two studies define "economic" regulations very
differently and employ disparate approaches to estimating their costs. They rely
on similar sources and methods to estimate the cost of "social" regulation, but
their scope of coverage within that overall category is markedly different: the
Crains tally the cost of only EPA and OSHA regulations, while Crews sweeps
much more broadly to encompass regulations issued by many other executive
branch agencies. Given the size of the discrepancies in the values of individual
cost components that comprise their aggregate figure, it seems clear that the
congruence of the Crains' and Crews's end results-S2.028 trillion versus
$1.902 trillion (a mere 7 percent discrepancy)-is either a remarkable
coincidence or the result of an intentional effort to manufacture convergence.
In any case, since the two studies employ radically different methods to
estimate the cost of "economic" regulation, the discussion that follows assesses
those methods separately, with subpart A. 1 devoted to the Crain and Crain study
and subpart A.2 to Crews's analysis. For the remaining regulatory cost
categories-social regulation, tax compliance, and homeland security-the two
studies employ similar methods (though their scope is different) so their sources
and methods studies will be assessed in tandem, with subparts B, C.1, and C.2
49. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 40 tbl.6. The Crais do not use the term "social regulation."
Their categories are "Economic," "Environmental," "Tax Compliance," and "OSHHS" (OSHA plus
Homeland Security). Id. Since "Environmental" and "OSHA" regulations are included within the category
of social regulation in Crews's nomenclature, we added the $330 billion figure that appears in the Crains'
Table 6 for "Environmental" to the $71 billion figure for OSHA regulation in Crain (2014) Table 4, p. 37
to yield the $401 billion figure for "Social Costs" in the Crain column.
50. Figures in this column are derived from Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34. The Total for
All Federal Regulations of $1,902 billion is found in Row 162. Source for the remaining figures in the
Crews column are as follows: "Economic" Regulations: row 14; "Social" Regulation: sum of numbers in
rows 162 through 164 and row 16 plus sum of all Crews mods and supplements for Executive branch
agencies (tabulated in rows 21 to 93 of column J); Tax Compliance: row 17; Homeland Security: row 50;
Independent Agency Costs: row 165, plus row 166 plus sum of figures appearing as "Crews Mods and
Supps" in column J, rows 96 through 159. Id.
2018]
ECOLOGY LA W QUARTERLY
examining the Crains' and Crews's estimates of annual cost for social regulation,
tax compliance, and homeland security, respectively. 5 1
A. "Economic" Regulations
The Crains' regulatory cost estimate of $1.448 trillion for "economic"
regulations is very high, more than three times the magnitude of Crews's estimate
of roughly $400 billion.52 One explanation for the discrepancy may be found in
the uniquely broad definition of economic regulations they employed, a usage
that departs sharply from Crews's, OMB's, and most other analysts' definition
of the term.53 The standard approach followed by OMB, OECD, and Crews
defines "economic" regulation to refer to a particular set of market access and
price regulations in (once) pervasively regulated sectors such as airlines,
trucking, rail, electricity, and telecommunications. 54 The Crains, by contrast,
define "economic" regulations much more broadly to include virtually all
regulations of economic activities of any kind.55 Having chosen an all-
encompassing definition, the Crains conclude: "Obviously the reach of economic
regulations is vast. This means that an encompassing methodology is required to
derive an estimate of these costs." 56
1. The Crains' Estimate ($1.448 trillion)
The "encompassing methodology" the Crains chose for estimating
"economic regulatory costs" thus defined is to regress per capita GDP against an
index drawn from an opinion poll. 57 This section will demonstrate rigorously
what intuition would suggest: there is no statistical abracadabra that allows one
to generate objectively reliable measures from a casual opinion poll of
nonexperts. We will see that their methodology is invalid and their conclusions
meaningless, despite the fact that they managed to find a "statistically
significant" correlation between two variables. In fact, we will explore how they
accomplished that statistical "rabbit-out-of-the-hat" trick.
51. See discussion infra, Parts III.C-III.E.
52. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 50; Crews, Commandments (2016), supra note 15, at 10 fig. 1.
53. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 28.
54. Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 36 ("Economic regulation, as defined by OMB in
that era 'restricts the prince or quantity of a product or service that firms produce including whether firms
can enter or exit specific industries."')
55. Id. The Crains define "economic" regulation to include:
rules that govern decision-making in market transactions. These include markets for final
goods and services; markets for physical and human resources; credit markets; and markets for
the transport and delivery of products and factors of production. Economic regulations affect
who can produce; what can (or cannot) be produced; how to produce; where to sell; input and
product pricing; and what product information must be or cannot be provided.
Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 28. This definition sweeps in virtually the entire category of what OMB
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a. Overview of Methodology
The Crains' regression adopts an Economic Regulation Index (ERI) as its
main variable of interest. This Index is derived from a much larger opinion
survey conducted by the World Economic Forum (WEF), a nonprofit
organization based in Switzerland. 58 Each year the WEF compiles a Global
Competitiveness Index (GCI) which ranks the overall "competitiveness" of 148
countries based upon their score (on a scale from one to seven) on 114 different
criteria grouped into twelve separate "pillars." 59 The ranking on thirty-eight of
these criteria is determined largely by objective data drawn from published
sources. 60 Scores on the remaining seventy-six criteria are determined by asking
an average of ninety-five business executives (of which nearly half are leaders
of small businesses) in each country to complete an Executive Opinion Survey
that asks one question about each of these eighty-one topics. 6 1
From this list of seventy-six questions, the Crains chose the following three
questions to serve as the basis for their self-styled ERI:
1.09 Burden of government regulation: In your country how burdensome is
it for businesses to comply with governmental administrative requirements
(e.g. permits, regulations, reporting?) (1 = extremely burdensome; 7 = not
burdensome at all);
1.11 Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations: In your
country, how easy is it for private businesses to challenge government
actions and/or regulations through the legal system? (1 = extremely difficult;
7 = extremely easy);
8.07 Regulation of Securities Exchanges: In your country how effective are
the regulation of securities exchanges? (1= not at all effective; 7 = extremely
effective). 62
The remaining seventy-three questions cover the waterfront in much the
same fashion, asking each business executive to rate his or her country's
performance on matters ranging from the quality of health and primary
58. Id.at3l-32.
59. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013-2014: FULL DATA
EDITION (Klaus Schwab, ed., 2013), at 49-51, 83-85 and 383 [hereinafter, WEF 2013-2014 Global
Competitiveness Report]. The Pillars are: Institutions, Infrastructure, Macroeconomic Environment,
Health and Primary Education, Higher Education and Training, Goods Market Efficiency, Labor Market
Efficiency, Financial Market Development, Technological Readiness, Market Size, Business
Sophistication, and Innovation. Note that "Quality of Government Regulation" is not deemed by the
compilers to the Index to be of sufficient importance to national competitiveness to warrant mention as a
separate category. There is one question (among eighty-one) devoted to the "Burden of Government
Regulation" and two other questions that include the word "regulation." These three questions supply the
data for the entirety of the Crams' home-made "Economic Regulatory Index." Id. at 401.
60. Id. at 541-45 (listing thirty-two criteria determined by objective data and three criteria
determined by subjecting ratings from other, non-WEF polls).
61. Id. at 94.
62. Id. at 418, 420, 506.
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education, to tax policy, competition policy, trade policy, quality of scientific
research institutions, and the quality of roads, airports, electricity supply, etc.6 3
WEF staff then compute the average value of each country's ranking on
each criterion. The final step for WEF is to assign weights to each of these 114
average scores (seventy-six derived from the Executive Opinion Survey and
thirty-eight from other sources) and aggregate them into a single GCI score and
ranking for each country.64 This is done year after year, producing time series as
well as cross-sectional data on how businessmen rate their country's
performance on the factors that WEF staff believe contribute to each country's
global competitiveness and hence its national wealth.
The Crams did not use the overall GCI, however. Their sole interest in the
WEF study is as a repository of opinion poll ratings from which they can pluck
scores for the three poll questions with the word "regulation" in them. These
scores are averaged to yield the Crains' self-styled ERI for the United States and
for thirty-three other OECD countries each year from 2006 to 2013. They then
use these composite ERI scores along with data on their selected control
variables for each OECD country in each of the years covered by their regression
analysis. This generates a panel of data spanning thirty-four countries and eight
years. 65
They then proceed to conduct their regression using the following
regression model: 66
In(PCGDPi,t) = J(ERIi,t-i) + ()(Z) i,t-I + i -+ Ei,t
where:
PCGDP stands for per capita GDP in country "i" and year "t";
ERI stands for Economic Regulation Index for each country i in each
year t;
P is the regression coefficient for ERI. It is calculated by the regression
and is the key variable of interest in the equation; 67
X represents a "vector" of control variables chosen by the authors to
control for factors other than ERI that might influence per capita GDP;68
63. Id. at 383.
64. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 59, at 78-79.
65. The Crains announce that "GDP per capita" is entered as a logarithmic transformation to permit
a comparison between a percentage change in the variable of interest and percentage changes in per capita
GDP. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 32.
66. Id. at 31-32. The equation that appears on page 31 of the Crains' unpublished study lacks a
logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable. The authors clearly state, however, that "GDP per
capita and the size of the labor force are entered into the regression models as natural logarithmic
transformations," Id. at 32. Moreover, even approximate reproduction oftheirresults is impossible without
such a transformation. So we must assume that the equation that appears on page 31 of their report is
either an intentional simplification of the equation they actually used, or else a mistake.
67. Note that they lag the ERI variable by one year so that ERI in year t- I is correlating with
PCGDP in year t. Id. at 31.
68 The control variables chosen by the Crains are: trade/GDP (foreign trade as a share of GDP);
dependency ratio (population over 65 relative to population aged 19-65); new capital investments as a
share of GDP; size of the labor force; tax revenues as a share of GDP; tax revenues as a share of GDP
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V is a "vector" of regression coefficients calculated for each control
variable included in the vector of control variables;
ai is a country-wide fixed effects variable that appears in their regression
equation but was not actually used;69 and
Fi,t is an error term for each country "i" and year "t" which is assumed to
be the product of random factors and thus normally distributed around a
correct estimate.
The Crains report that the regression analysis described above yielded a
value of 0.081 for 13, with a greater-than-95 percent level of statistical
significance.7 0 They then calculate the mean value of the ERI for the five highest-
ranked OECD countries and compare it to the U.S. score on the ERI.71 For 2012,
it turns out that the average score of the five highest-ranked countries was 26
percent higher than the score for the United States, from which the Crains
conclude that "if the burden of economic regulations in the United States
matched the benchmark countries, U.S. GDP would be $1.439 trillion higher
than it was in 2012 (denominated in 2014 dollars)." 72
b. Critique
To a pundit or policy maker not immersed in the nuances of empirical
analysis, a study such as the one done by the Crains might easily pass for sound
scholarship. "Is it likely," the lay person may ask, "that a correlation between
two variables would be statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence level
if there is no real world relationship between the variables?"
The answer, in a nutshell, is yes. It turns out to be quite possible to generate
regression coefficients that are "statistically significant" and large-and yet
specious. There are many ways to accomplish that, but two will be discussed in
this Article: (i) mis-specifying the regression model and (ii) choosing an invalid
and biased proxy for the main variable of interest. The Crains' model commits
both errors.
squared "to allow for a nonlinear effect of tax policy"; year = 2008 (a dummy variable inserted without
explanation); and year = 2009 (another dummy variable inserted without explanation). See Crain (2014),
supra note 14, at 32 34. The unexplained dummy variables for 2008 and 2009 probably reflect the
anomalous character of those years which marked the beginning of the Great Recession. See discussion
infra note 82 and accompanying text.
69. The Crams' published regression model includes the term ai suggesting that a "fixed-effects"
variable unique to each country "i" was used to account for endowment effects in each country. Crain
(2014), supra note 14, at 31-32. The Crains elsewhere indicate in a footnote, however, that they did not,
in fact, include country fixed-effects variables in the regression. See Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 33
n.28. Indeed, the actual use of a fixed-effects variable reduces the regression coefficient of ERI to near
zero and eliminates its statistical significance. See discussion infra at note 89 and accompanying text, and
Annex 3 col. 3.
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i. The Regression Model is Mis-specified
The economic literature is rich with studies of the impact of different
variables on national economic performance. Most such studies begin with an
effort to ground their selection of a regression model in a plausible causal theory
drawn from the economic literature on the determinants of national economic
performance. 73 The Crains, however, offer no such explanation of their choice
of dependent or independent variables. Indeed, their selection of variables is
accompanied by no justification beyond the cursory observation that "control
variables are drawn from the empirical literature that examines differences in
economic levels across countries and over time." 74
It turns out, however, that the Crains' choice of dependent variable (per
capita GDP, rather than growth rate of per capita GDP) is not only unexplained
but also methodologically unsound. Recognizing that the chief determinant of
this year's GDP is last year's GDP, the nearly universal practice in published
studies examining the influence of factors affecting macroeconomic performance
is to use GDP growth or per capita GDP growth as the dependent variable, rather
than per capita GDP.75 Indeed, all the externally published peer studies cited by
the Crams in their own paper use GDP growth rate, not GDP itself, as the
dependent variable. 7 6 Only one study referenced by the Crains uses per capita
GDP as the dependent variable, and even that study includes an examination of
impacts of the explanatory variables on per capita GDP growth as well,
recognizing that "[h]igher income levels are the result of higher past rates of
growth. If there is a causal relationship between institutional quality (or any other
73. See, e.g., Robert J. Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106 Q. J. ECON.
407, 407-09 (1991); Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Market Development and Long-Run Growth, 10
WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1996); Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful
for Growth?, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 600, 600-01 (1994); Ross Levine & David Renelt, A Sensitivity Analysis
of Cross-Country Growth Regressions, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 942, 943-45 (1992) (surveying a large
literature examining impacts of various variables on long-term average rates of GDP growth) [hereinafter,
Levine (1992)].
74. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 32.
75. See sources identified supra note 73; see also Levine (1992) supra note 73, at 962-63 (studies
surveyed).
76. See Crain (2014), supra note 14 at 32 n.26. The sources they cite in footnote 26 are Hall, Robert
E. & Charles I. Jones, Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?,
114 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 83, 108 (1999); Norman V. Loayza et al., Regulation and Macroeconomic
Performance (September 2004) (World Bank, unpublished Working Paper), https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/8953/wps3469.pdfsequence
=l&isAllowed=y[https://perma.cc/Q2EK-4G5H; James D. Gwartney et al., Economic Freedom,
Institutional Quality, and Cross-Country Differences in Income and Growth, 24 CATO J. 205, 210 (2004)
[hereinafter Gwartney]; Xavier Sala-i-Martin et al., Determinants of Long-Term Growth: A Bayesian
Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 813, 821 (2004); Fabio
Schiantarelli, Product Market Regulation and Macroeconomic Performance: A Review of Cross-Country
Evidence (August 4, 2008) (Boston College and IZA) (unpublished manuscript) http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-
p/wp623.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9E6-MYA7] (examining impact of regulation on economic growth and
citing to a 2004 IMF study which did the same). All these peer sources cited by the Crams use GDP growth
rate as a dependent variable and all but one use it as the sole dependent variable.
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independent variable) and per capita GDP, differences in growth rates should
also reflect this relationship." 77
We therefore consider what happens if GDP growth is substituted for GDP
as the dependent variable in the Crains' model. When this is done, the regression
coefficient loses statistical significance and changes sign to become negative-
suggesting a statistically insignificant but negative association between ERI and
economic growth.7 8
This is not necessarily the end of the story, however. Perhaps there are also
errors on the right side of the Crains' regression which, if corrected, would
restore ERI to its rightful place as a statistically significant factor shaping of per
capita GDP growth. As Finkelstein writes in his primer on use of statistics in law,
"[i]deally, the choice of explanatory factors would be determined by some
relevant theory that provides a basis for selecting factors and does not depend on
the particular available data."79 Again, the Crains offer no such theoretical
grounding for their regression conditioning set. However, in an important article
published in the American Economic Review in 1992, Levine and Renelt
surveyed an already vast literature that "uses cross-country regressions to search
for empirical linkages between long-run average growth rates and a variety of
economic policy, political, and institutional factors suggested by theory." 80 They
distilled from the literature a set of variables (which they dubbed "I-variables")
that are frequently included as control variables in regressions of this kind. These
variables included investment share of GDP, initial level of real GDP per capita,
initial secondary school enrollment rate, and average annual rate of population
growth.81 Levine and Renelt also identified two variables, ratio of trade to output
and share of investment in GDP, that have exhibited a robust association with
per capita GDP growth across multiple model specifications in prior studies. The
Crains' model used these two variables among others.82 It also added a dummy
77. See Gwartney, supra note 76, at 216 (using both GDP growth and GDP as dependent variables).
78. See Annex, Table 3, column (4). Since a high ERI corresponds to low burden in the Crains'
methodology, their regression (when corrected to substitute per capita GDP growth for per capita GDP
on the left side) would suggest that greater regulatory burden correlates with a higher rate of economic
growth, though the relationship is not statistically significant by conventional measures. Again, because
the Crains refused to share their dataset, we were not able to use their exact data for our replication efforts,
so we used a data set as similar to theirs as we could find in the public sources they cite. See Annex, Tables
1-2.
79. MICHAEL. 0. FINKELSTEIN, BASIC CONCEPTS OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS IN LAW 145,
145 (Springer 2009) [hereinafter Finkelstein (2009)].
80. See Levine (1992) supra note 73, at 942 and sources cited therein.
81. Id. at 494.
.82. Crain (2014) supra note 14, at 32-33. The Crains' control variables are trade/GDP, new capital
investment, dependency ratio (population over 65 relative to population aged 19-65), tax revenues/GDP,
(tax revenues/GDP) "to allow for a non-linear effect of tax policy," and size of the labor force. The first
two of these variables are supported by the Levine & Renelt analysis. The next three variables that appear
in the Crain regression are not mentioned in Levine (1992) (see Levine (1992) supra note 73, at 960-61
for a list of variables studied), but may well have emerged as significant factors since 1992. The Crains'
decision to use labor force size rather than population growth rate or labor force growth rate is truly
difficult to understand. Certainly, population growth rate would be an obvious choice for a model aimed
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variable for each of the years 2008 and 2009.83 While they did not supply their
reasoning in print, this presumably was intended to account for the unusual
economic conditions that prevailed in those years in the aftermath of the 2008
market crash.
So, as a further test of the robustness of the association the Crains claim to
have found between ERI and macroeconomic performance, we explored what
happens if one regresses per capita GDP growth against the Crains' ERI, using
the standard set of control variables suggested by Levine and Renelt along with
the two variables that were shown by those authors to have a stable and robust
association with growth (ratio of trade to GDP and capital expenditure to GDP-
both also used by the Crains), and the Crains' suggested dummy variables for
2008 and 2009. The results of that effort are displayed in the Annex to this
Article, Table 5, column 2. The bottom line is: once again, the regression
coefficient changes sign and becomes statistically insignificant by common
measures.
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that the Crains' regression
coefficient for ERI depends for its statistical significance (and even its correct
sign) on the use of a problematic dependent variable, per capita GDP, in the
regression. When the dependent variable that conforms to standard practice (per
capita GDP growth) is used, the correlation disappears and cannot be resurrected
by altering the specification of the model to reflect a reasonably standard and
reputable set of control variables. It would appear that the "statistically
significant" performance of ERI in the regression depends upon the use of an
incorrectly-specified dependent variable.
While the Crains' regression model does not yield a statistically significant
association between ERI and economic growth, their unique model employing
per capita GDP turns out to be very capable of assigning specious "statistical
significance" to the regression coefficients for any number of other variables.84
Recall, for example, that the ERI index chosen by the Crains is a composite
of three scores chosen from a WEF survey of over eighty questions. Each
question on the survey was chosen because the WEF study authors regarded it as
a potential contributor to national "competitiveness." We now explore what
happens if we substitute six of these other variables (chosen without prior
knowledge of the results) for ERI one at a time, in the regression model that the
Crains actually used.
at explaining economic growth, so that is the independent variable chosen in our robustness experiment
(see Annex A Table 5).
83. See Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 34 tbl.3.
84. Indeed, the Crams demonstrate that their model will generate statistically significant and large
regression coefficients for the similar, but different, World Bank Regulatory Quality Index they used in
their 2010 study as well as the Economic Freedom of the World Index. See Crain (2014), supra note 14,
at 68-71. This magic trick, used to suggest robustness of their estimation method, becomes less impressive
when one understands that the Crams' regression model cannot explain per capita GDP growth at all, but
it can make almost any variable look good when regressed against per capita GDP.
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The results of that experiment: all but one of these factors-when run
through the 2014 Crains' regression model--emerge with high regression
coefficients that are "statistically significant" at a higher than 95 percent
confidence level, just like the ERI index. 85 Indeed, the same regression technique
that yields the Crains' $1.43 trillion cost figure for regulation yields the following
implicit cost to U.S. GDP of falling short of the benchmark (Top-Five-in-the-
World) rating on five other criteria:
Table 2
Implicit Costs to GDP of Sample WEF variables
Substituted for ERI in the Crains' Regression Model
Statistically Significant Indices Implicit cost
1.04 Public Trust in Politicians $1.863 trillion
1.06 Judicial Independence $1.352 trillion
1.07 Official Favoritism $1.124 trillion
1.08 Wastefulness of Government Spending $1.507 trillion
1.15 Organized Crime $1.993 trillion
Total $7.839 trillion
Such results obviously strain credulity. Are we really to believe that failure
to achieve "Top-Five" scores on the "judicial independence" survey costs the
U.S. economy nearly $1.4 trillion? That the United States could add over $1
trillion dollars per year to the GDP by achieving "Top-Five" standards of
avoiding official favoritism in decisions of government officials? That attaining
"Top-Five" excellence on these five criteria alone would add, collectively, nearly
$8 trillion per year to the U.S. GDP?
While a complete diagnosis of the causes of these spurious correlations are'
beyond our present scope, one obvious explanation for the Crains' results
presents itself. Indeed, CRS hinted at this in its review of the 2010 Crains' study,
which employed a similar methodology. 8 6 Basic statistical theory teaches that
omitting key explanatory variables that are correlated with both an included
variable and the dependent variable can cause the regression to spit out a
regression coefficient for the included variable that is both biased and speciously
precise. The intuitive reason is that the explanatory power of the omitted
variable(s) gets attributed to the one variable that is included and that correlates
with both them and the dependent variable.87
85. See Annex, Table 4, columns (1) through (6).
86. CRS (2016), supra note 17, at 22.
87. WILLIAM E. GRIFFITHS ET AL., LEARNING AND PRACTICING ECONOMETRICS 307-09 (1993)
(discussing causes and consequences of omitted variable bias). CRS researcher, Maeve Carey, speculated
as to the possibility of this sort of bias in her review of the Crams' 2010 regression analyses. See Maeve
P. Carey, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44348 METHODS OF ESTIMATING THE TOTAL COST OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS 22 (Jan. 21, 2016), citing Harrington, infra note 196, at 12. Here, in fact, the WEF study
supplies dozens of candidates for omitted variables that may contribute to GDP quite independently of
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In this case, the most likely explanation for the Crains' anomalous results is
that they omitted from their regression an array of relevant variables that,
together, reflects various countries' levels of development, quality of
governance, education system, enterprise system, and infrastructure overall.
Moreover, these long-term and slowly-changing or unchanging attributes tend to
go together, meaning that countries that score well or poorly on one index in this
bundle also tend to do well or poorly on others. Such attributes form a sort of
endowment for each country. There is a statistical regression technique that
allows researchers to control for such endowment effects. It is called a "fixed
effects" model, and it is a widely used and recommended practice in the
estimation of panel data such as that which the Crains employ. 88 It would seem
particularly appropriate in this case, given the Crains' decision to use per capita
GDP rather than per capita GDP growth as the dependent variable, since per
capita GDP is itself, in the main, a relatively long-term attribute that in normal
times varies only marginally from year to year. The Crains did not use the fixed-
effects model, however. When we ran the Crains' regression using their model
specification but inserting a fixed-effects parameter, the regression coefficient
on ERI once again changed signs and lost its statistical significance. 89
The anomalies that surfaced with the Crains' regression highlight a larger
problem, one that bedevils even studies constructed more rigorously than the
Crains' regression. The previously-discussed Levine and Renelt study in 1992
identified "over 50 variables [that] have been found to be significantly correlated
with growth in at least one regression."9 0 Levine and Renelt then employed a
technique known as Extreme Bounds Analysis to test the robustness of the
regressions examining these variables. This analysis revealed that only two
variables-ratio of trade to output and share of investment in GDP-exhibit a
robust relationship to per capita GDP growth, i.e., one whose statistical
significance does not depend heavily on particular choice of control variables
chosen for the right side of the equation. 9 1 All other identified relationships "are
very sensitive to slight alterations in the conditioning set of variables, and many
publicized coefficients change sign with small changes in the conditioning set of
regulatory stringency or quality, and there may be other contributing variables not covered by WEF. Since
all these variables are omitted from the regression, their explanatory power would be attributed to the
included variable, ERI, along with any other included variable with which the omitted variables may
happen to correlate.
88. Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Fixed Effects Estimation, INTRODUCTORY ECONONETRICS: A MODERN
APPROACH (5th ed.) at 484-99 (2013).
89. See Annex, Table 1 column 3 for that result. The Crains explain in a footnote that they did not
use a fixed-effects model because "the number of years in the sample period is somewhat modest (2006
to 2013)." Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 33 n.28. The proper response to that problem, however, would
have been to expand the sample to include more years, rather than ignoring the model and omitting the
effects for which it corrects.
90. Levine (1992), supra note 73, at 942
91. Id. at 943. This author is not aware of any study since the 1992 Levine & Renelt study that has
updated their analysis or otherwise identified additional variables that exhibit a robust relationship to per
capita economic growth across multiple sets of control variables.
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variables." 92 They concluded that "there does not exist a consensus theoretical
framework to guide empirical work on growth, and existing models do not
completely specify the variables that should be held constant while conducting
statistical inference on the relationship between growth and the variables of
interest."93
In the absence of any clear guidance given by economic theory as to which
explanatory control variables should be included in regression analysis, analysts
sometimes use statistical regression to test different variables against the data set
and then choose the variables that exhibit the best fit. This practice, which some
criticize as "data-dredging," can yield valid insights into economic behavior, but
only if the model thus generated is then tested against a different data set (or
multiple data sets) and proves itself robust. In most cases, we would expect the
model to fail that additional test if the model is, in reality, just the chance artifact
of the algorithm and the data set that produced it.94 There is no evidence that the
Crains took this extra step, however.
Though this author is not privy to the Crains' work product, their failure to
ground their model in the economic literature or even choose the appropriate
dependent variable strongly suggests that the close fit they achieved is best
explained by a combination of omitted variable bias, endowment effects, a mis-
specified dependent variable and data-dredging. 95 Even if they had been able to
show a strong association between ERI and economic growth, their results would
not have been robust enough to support a major policy shift without an additional
demonstration of robustness across multiple data sets (e.g., different years or
different choices of countries) and/or a range of plausible alterations in the set of
conditioning variables.
This Subpart has shown that the Crains' model is not solidly grounded in a
plausible theory of the determinants of economic growth or income, and that it
employs an incorrectly-specified dependent variable while omitting important
explanatory variables and endowment effects. The model that they use generates
impressive results for ERI and for a host of other variables. These impressive
results disappear, however, and the regression coefficient becomes insignificant
92. Id. at 942-43.
93. Id.
94. For an excellent description of this problem, see Finkelstein (2009), supra note 79, at 145-46.
95. Another consideration that supports a hypothesis of data-dredging is their strategic choice of
components for ERI. The most straightforward and intuitive indicator of regulatory burden to use in their
regression would have been simply "Burden of government regulations." Annex Table 4 columns (7) and
(8) show what happens if the Crains' composite index of three indicators-1.09 Burden of Government
Regulations; 1.11 Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations; and 1.08 Regulation of
securities exchanges-is deconstructed into components and substituted in the Crains' regression for ERI.
Interestingly, Burden of Government Regulation only has a small value and is not statistically significant
by traditional measures, when inserted by itself into the Crains' regression in place of ERI. It gains a
statistically significant regression coefficient only when bundled with two other measures that do not
directly track regulatory burden.
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and changes sign, when the dependent variable is correctly specified as per capita
GDP growth.
Such deficiencies are more than enough to disqualify the Crains' study from
serious consideration as the basis for a major policy shift. Even looking beyond
the shortcomings of their choice of control and dependent variables, however,
the Crains' study should be discounted for a second reason: their decision to use
an index drawn from a multinational opinion poll as the proxy for regulatory
stringency. Because this strategy has been employed in other studies, 9 6 the next
subpart will assess the additional issues raised by that estimation approach.
ii. Pitfalls of Using Opinion Polls as Proxies for Actual Numbers
For a regression equation to supply probative statistical evidence of
meaningful correlation between two variables, both theory and common sense
instruct that the main variable of interest must provide a reasonable, unbiased
measure or proxy of the thing being measured: it should exhibit "construct
validity." 9 7 In this case, that means that ERI must provide a valid proxy for actual
regulatory stringency. The WEF opinion poll on which the Crains rely clearly
does not meet that condition. Rather than elicit informed measures or estimates
of actual regulatory stringency or burden, the WEF poll simply asks respondents
to rate on a scale from one to seven the intensity of their disagreement or
agreement with a sweeping generality about seventy-six separate topics, only one
of which actually mentions regulatory burden.
Using such an index as a proxy for regulatory stringency encounters at least
three methodological objections from the standpoint of construct validity.
First, the WEF index is subjective and not necessarily well informed. Given
that poll respondents are asked to opine on scores of separate topics ranging from
quality of education to the effectiveness of stock market regulation to the honesty
of their government, they could not possibly be expected to have a sound
empirical grounding for fully informed opinions on all or even most of the
questions asked. Nor is it reasonable to assume that their uninformed answers
will distribute normally around the "right answer" as the mean. Consider, by way
of illustration, the recent "Perils of Perception Poll" conducted by research
96. See, e.g., NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON
SMALL FIRMS, REPORT FOR SBA OFFICE OF ADVOCACY UNDER CONTRACT NUMBER SBAHQ-08 M-0466
(Sept. 2010) [hereinafter Crain (2010)] at 19 (reporting that the authors regress per capita GDP of various
countries over time against, inter alia, a "Regulatory Quality Index" drawn from "polls of perceptions [by
business leaders] of the ability of governments to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations
that permit and promote private sector development." See also Gwartney, supra note 76, at 216.
97. PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS (6th ed.) at 281-92 (2008); ROBERT M.
LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 35-36 (Kluwer 2016) (discussing the concept and
requirement of construct validity). Indeed, courts have rejected regression models used to support claims
of employment discrimination when confronted with evidence that the measure used as a proxy for labor
market experience was biased and inaccurate. See Finkelstein (2009), supra note 79, at 146-47 (discussing
the impact of biased proxies on regression coefficients and describing the court's rejection of a model
employing an inaccurate proxy).
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company Ipsos Mori.98 That survey of 27,000 people from forty countries
revealed that many people are uninformed about basic facts in their own country.
Moreover, Americans were the fifth least informed about their own country, and
their average guesses were often wildly off the mark and did not disperse around
the correct mean value even when many guesses were taken. To take just one
example, U.S. respondents were asked "[w]hat percentage of total annual gross
domestic product do you think is spent on health expenditures every year?" The
mean response is 31 percent. The actual spending ratio, according to the poll is
18 percent, a 72 percent discrepancy. 99 Similar discrepancies surfaced in other
questions, even when-unlike the WEF questions-the questions asked were
about a number that someone knows.100
Second, there are strong a priori reasons to suppose that the index of
American business opinions about the burden of U.S. regulation may be
influenced by the messages respondents are getting, directly or indirectly, from
Crews, the Crains, and many similar voices. Behavioral economics teaches that
causal perceptions are subject to error-inducing "heuristics." One of these, the
"availability heuristic," describes the tendency of observers' perceptions of a risk
or cost or other factor to be shaped by the availability of vivid illustrations of that
factor.101 For example, estimates of the risk of air travel increase after a widely-
publicized air disaster, and assessments of the risks of guns increase after a mass
shooting, etc. 10 2 There is no reason to suppose the logic of the availability
heuristic to be limited to perceptions of the risk of mass disasters. Repeated
reinforcement of a claim or point of view in speeches, in the news media, at
business conferences, in trade association letters, in congressional testimony,
etc., may exert a similar biasing influence on the business community via the
availability heuristic.
In the U.S. regulatory context, we have seen the media attention given to
the Crains' 2010 study of regulatory burden and to the latest edition of Crews's
98. Elizabeth Chang, Many Americans have Inaccurate Perceptions about the U.S., WASH. POST.
MAG., May 21, 2017, at 10.
99. Id.
100. See id. (documenting Americans' erroneous views that the U.S. population is 17 percent
Muslim, compared with the actual reality that it is 1 percent Muslim, and the false perception that the least
wealthy 70 percent own 28 percent of the total wealth in American while, in truth, that 70 percent of the
population only possesses 6 percent of the wealth).
101. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1127 28 (1974); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY207, 230 (1973), available online at
doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9; Karyn Riddle, Always on My Mind: Exploring How Frequent,
Recent, and Vivid Television Portrayals Are Used in the Formation of Social Reality Judgments, 13(2)
MEDIA PSYCHOLOGY 155, 159 (2008), available online at doi:10.1080/152132610 0 380014 0 .
102. See Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463. 465-66 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Josh
Blackman & Shelby Baird, The Shooting Cycle, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1513, 1525-26 (2014).
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work. 103 These are only the latest installments of a series of similar studies. 104
Perusing the websites of the National Association of Manufacturers, the
Chamber of Commerce, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Heritage
Foundation, the Cato Institute, the Heartland Institute, the Small Business
Administration (SBA) Office of Advocacy, and the Mercatus Center reveals a
cottage industry of well-funded advocates dedicated to the mission of
highlighting the burden of government and of government regulation in the
United States, thus making it "available" to U.S. citizens, including and
especially the U.S. business community.10 5 Indeed, the SBA and the National
Association of Manufacturers (NAM) funded the two Crains' studies.106 We
must presume that the SBA's and NAM's business executive constituents have
been made aware of the Crains' findings. That would surely influence their
responses to poll questions about the burden, of government regulation.
It may be the case, of course, that similarly dedicated efforts to highlight
regulatory burden are occurring in all the countries ranked above and below the
United States in the WEF poll, such that these biasing influences cancel each
other out. While an empirical assessment of that possibility is beyond our present
scope, it seems unlikely given the regulatory regimes of the top-ranked countries
in the Global Competitiveness survey. That list includes countries such as
Germany, Sweden, Austria, Finland, Latvia, Estonia and the Netherlands-all
members of a European Union that is not particularly noted for regulatory
laxity.107
Given the circumstances reviewed above, it would seem difficult for the
Crains to establish with a high degree of confidence that the ordinal ranking
captured by the WEF is actually an independent variable and not simply a
103. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Crain (2010), supra note 96; W. MARK CRAIN & THOMAS D. HOPKINS, THE IMPACT
OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS: A REPORT FOR THE OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U. S. SMALL
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION RFP No. SBAHQ-00-R-0027 (2001).
105. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, https://www.nam.org/About/ (last visited
Jan. 25, 2019); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://www.uschamber.com/about-us/about-us-chamber
/policymaking-process (last visited Jan. 25, 2019); COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, https://cei.org
/about-cei (last visited Jan. 25, 2019); THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, https://www.heritage.org/about-
heritage/mission (last visited Jan. 25, 2019); CATO INSTITUTE, https://www.cato.org/about (last visited
Jan. 25, 2019); THE HEARTLAND INSTITUTE, https://www.heartland.org/about-us/index.html (last visited
Jan. 25, 2019); U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/what-we-
do/mission (last visited Jan. 25, 2019); MERCATUS CENTER, https://www.mercatus.org/about (last visited
Jan. 25, 2019).
106. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at I ("The Cost of Federal Regulation to the U.S. Economy,
Manufacturing and Small Business: A Report for the National Association of Manufacturers" (Sept. 10,
2014)); Crain (2010), supra note 96 ("... Report for SBA Office of Advocacy under contract number
SBAHQ-08_M-0466 (Sept. 2010)").
107. See Jonathan B. Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the United States and
Europe, 5 J. RISK RESEARCH 317, 318 (2002) (comparing U.S. and European Union regulatory regimes
for degree of "precaution" evident in regulatory regimes and finding rough equivalency overall, with
specific differences in individual categories).
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reflection of the effectiveness of their own past propaganda operating through
the availability heuristic.
Finally, it bears mention that two of the three variables selected by the
Crains-1.11 Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations and 8.07
Regulation of Securities Exchanges--do not necessarily correlate with
regulatory stringency.108 Lawsuits may be, and regularly are, brought to
challenge regulations for being too weak as well as too strong. Regulation of
securities exchanges might well find favor with business respondents for
effectively protecting against fraud by their competitors. High scores on such
indices might correlate with costlier regulation, not less. Such questions raise
further doubts as to what it is that ERI actually tracks, and whether it reliably
correlates with actual regulatory burden.10 9
The preceding discussion has shown that the Crains' regression model
exhibits multiple methodological flaws that preclude confidence in its results. In
fairness to the Crains, we have seen that even more sophisticated regression
models-models well-grounded in the literature and examining impacts on GDP
growth (not GDP)-often fail to demonstrate a robust association with per capita
GDP growth.1I" 0
This highlights a general paradox: highly "significant" statistical
correlations are much more readily achievable than most statistical laymen are
likely to appreciate. This is counterintuitive because impressive results are hard
to obtain in most walks of life. Mistakes tend to lead to clear failure. When an
airplane is badly designed it never takes off, or it falls out of the sky. Yet a badly
done statistical regression may "fly" farther and faster than a better-built study-
delivering results that appear more dramatic and achieve more fame than could
be achieved by more rigorous methods. This anomaly creates strong temptations
to cut comers. It also underscores the importance of ensuring expert, impartial,
and external review and validation of any statistical study that is used to shape
public policy, particularly in a realm such as regulation, where ideologues and
interest groups have a strong interest in generating and promoting studies that
will support their position on a controversial issue.
2. The Crews Estimate of Economic Regulatory Costs ($398.75 billion)
Unlike the Crains, Crews follows OMB practice in defining economic
regulations as rules governing entry, pricing, and access in the energy,
108. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 68.
109. This foregoing discussion is not intended as a criticism of the WEF study when used for its
intended purpose. The WEF study clearly is meant to offer an index of how business respondents in
different countries perceive their government's and their country's performance in a wide variety of
categories. In the absence of hard data, that is a highly useful tool. But the WEF poll was never meant to
be used as the Crains use it, as a measure of objective reality leveraged to such an extent that every change
of one-tenth of a point in the rating (in the case of the U.S.) corresponds to more than $100 billion change
in implied regulatory costs.
110. See supra discussion accompanying notes 91-92.
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transportation (airlines, rail and trucking), and telecommunications sectors.1 11
Despite this limitation, and the fact that most of these sectors have been
substantially deregulated, Crews tallies $398.75 billion in costs for "economic"
regulations. 112 The genesis of that number is important to understand for two
reasons: it is a large number, and it aptly illustrates both his overall approach to
cost estimation and the drawbacks of that approach.
Crews drew his $398.75 billion figure from a 2001 report by Crain and
Hopkins, commissioned by the SBA Office of Advocacy, which estimated the
efficiency costs of economic regulations in 2000 at $101 billion and transfer costs
at $202 billion. This yields a cost estimate of $303 billion per year in 2001
dollars, or $398.75 billion in 2013 dollars. 113
Crews leaves it at that. But following the trail of footnotes one step further
reveals that Crain and Hopkins offered no actual analysis to support their cost
estimate. They simply lifted it, with appropriate attribution, from the following
two sentences appearing in 1999 study by the OECD: "The OECD estimates that
reforms in the transportation, energy and telecommunicatidns sectors would lead
to an increase in U.S. GDP of 1 percent. That 1 percent of U.S. GDP in 2000
(equal to $10.1 trillion) yields an efficiency cost of $101 billion."1 1 4
To this $101 billion, Crain and Hopkins then add on another $202 billion in
"transfer costs" using a two-fold multiplier that they derive from a 1991 Hahn
and Hird study on the theory (critiqued below) that every dollar efficiency cost
is accompanied by two dollars in transfer costs and that all these costs are a drain
on GDP. 115
The question then arises: how does the 1999 OECD derive its $101 billion
estimate? It turns out that the 1999 OECD study offers no analysis to support a
$100 billion cost estimate. 116 It simply refers, in one sentence, to a still-earlier
(1997) OECD report for the proposition that further regulatory reform in the
transportation, energy, and telecommunications sectors might increase U.S. GDP
111. See Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 36 (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE
OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS 15-24 (2002)).
112. Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 36-37; Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34, at
row 14.
113. W. Mark Crain & Thomas D. Hopkins, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS:
A REPORT FOR THE OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, RFP No.
SBAHQ-00-R-0027, at 11, 25 (2001) [hereinafter, Crain and Hopkins (2001)] ("Table 8. Total Cost of
Federal Regulations: By Type and Allocation Between Business and Others (in billions of2000 dollars)").
114. Id. at 11 n.12 (citing to ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
Regulatory Reform in the United States, OECD REVIEWS OF REGULATORY REFORM (1999) [hereinafter,
OECD Review of U.S. Regulatory Reform, 1999]).
. 115. Id. at 11 (citing Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review
and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REGULATION 233 (1991) [hereinafter, Hahn & Hird (1991)]).
116. The 1999 OECD Report does note that past de-regulatory efforts had been estimated by a prior
analyst to have increased U.S. GDP by 1 percent. OECD Review of U.S. Regulatory Reform, 1999, supra
note 114, at 34 (citing Clifford Winston, US Industry Adjustment to Economic Deregulation, 12 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 89, 99 (1998)).
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by an additional 1 percent.117 However, the 1997 OECD study contains no
mention of any such figure in the main ("synthesis") report.1' 8 There is a
background study for the report, a study urging deregulation of the
telecommunications sector, and that background chapter cites a 1995 Report by
the Council on Economic Advisers (CEA) in support of the Clinton
Administration's then-proposed legislation to open telecommunications markets
to more competition. The CEA study predicted in 1995 that enacting that re-
regulatory legislation "could add $100 billion to GDP over the next decade." 119
That figure corresponds to roughly 1 percent of U.S. GDP at that time,120 and it
may be the figure to which the 1999 OECD report was referring.
If so, it would appear that OECD staff did not bother, in either 1997 or 1999,
to determine whether the legislation that motivated the CEA report in 1995 had
passed or failed since the publication of that report. It turns out that Congress
enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and it was signed into law, bringing
about a sweeping deregulation of the telecommunications industry that
presumably reaped whatever GDP gains the CEA believed could be fairly
attributed to its passage. 12 1 With that event, the factual predicate for the Crain
and Hopkins (and later) Crews $101 billion regulatory cost estimate simply
disappeared.122
117. OECD Review of U.S. Regulatory Reform, 1999, supra note 114, at 36 ("The OECD Report
on Regulatory Reform (1997) estimated that the impact of additional sectoral regulatory reforms in
transportation, energy and telecommunications would raise labour, capital and total factor productivity in
the economy as a whole by one-half percentage point each. This was estimated to increase GDP by an
additional one percent.").
118. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, The OECD Report
on Regulatory Reform: Synthesis Report 15 (1997) [hereinafter, "OECD Report on Regulatory Reform,
1997"] (suggesting that regulatory reform in these fields might increase GDP in more regulated countries
without explicitly positing how much the U.S. GDP might increase with regulatory reform).
119. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, The OECD Report on
Regulatory Reform: Vol. I, Sectoral Studies (1997) at 48, citing CEA, Economic Benefits of the
Administration's Legislative Proposals for Telecommunications (June 1994).
120. See Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Economic Research: U.S. Gross Domestic Product in
Billions of Chained 2012 Dollars (reporting US GDP of roughly $10.5 trillion in 1995), available online
at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPCI [https://perma.cc/C2GB-FSLD].
121. Telecommunications Act of 1996, S. 516, 105th Cong. (1996) (enacted).
122. While passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not completely deregulate the
industry, the remaining costs of telecommunications regulation post-dated the turn of the century and were
not "legacy" economic regulatory costs. They are counted separately in a separate category of $131.6
billion per year of costs that Crews attributes to the "Federal Communications Commission." See Principia
Bureaucratica, supra note 34, at row 101; Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 122-23. Costberg
derives his $131.6 billion figure from Jerry Ellig, Costs and Consequences of Federal
Telecommunications Regulations," 58 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL 37 (2006) at tbl.2, 98-
99, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=982574## [https://perma.cc/EHK2-
Z6PL], by taking Ellig's estimate of $116.58 billion per year and adding a $15 billion per year placeholder
for the supposed cost of net neutrality regulation. Ellig is affiliated with the Mercatus Center. His 2006
study is a comprehensive snapshot of telecommunications regulatory costs as of that year. He estimates
$116.58 billion in telecommunications regulatory costs as of 2004, of which $100.8 billion (86 percent)
is accounted by transfer payments and foregone consumer surplus, neither of which qualify as costs to
GDP. Id. at 99 tbl.2. See discussion infra at note 123 and accompanying text. This means that Ellig's
estimated cost to GDP is really, at most, the foregone producer surplus of $41 billion. Even that amount
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The disappearance of the predicate for an estimated $101 billion in
efficiency costs likewise requires the subtraction of the $202 billion Crain and
Hopkins added in associated "transfer costs" by application of a supposed 2:1
transfer cost per efficiency cost multiplier. Moreover, use of such a multiplier
would have been inappropriate in any case in a measure of regulatory cost to
GDP, since basic macroeconomic theory teaches that transfer payments neither
add to nor subtract from GDP, growth, or jobs, but merely transfer wealth from
one individual or group to another.123 Given this fact, OMB's consistent practice
accordingly has been to exclude transfer payments from their tally of regulatory
costs to the economy. 124
Crews cites Crain and Hopkins who, in turn, cite Hahn and Hird for the
proposition that transfer costs of economic regulations are multiples of efficiency
costs. 125 Hahn and Hird themselves, however, separate efficiency costs from
transfer costs for the purpose of excluding the latter from the social cost
calculation. 126 Far from asserting that transfer payments subtract from GDP,
Hahn and Hird say precisely the opposite: "[t]ransfer payments are a
redistribution of benefits from one group to another that has no impact on total
economic output." 1 2 7
is probably an overestimate since the wealth transfer of $76 billion estimated in Ellig's table is a transfer
to producers, who will presumably allocate that sum to GDP-enhancing investments that Ellig does not
bother to account for. Id. In any case, even if one were to tally transfer payments as costs to GDP,
telecommunications regulatory costs should not be double-counted: once under the rubric of
"telecommunications" regulation and a second time under the rubric of "economic" regulation. Crews's
$402 billion "[b]aseline for aggregate annual economic regulation" thus remains unsubstantiated.
123 Paul M. Johnson, Transfer payment, A GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY TERMS,
http://www.aubum.edu/-johnspm/gloss/transferjpayment (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). Global Economic
Intersection, You Can Thank Transfer Payments for Boosting the U.S. GDP Recovery, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.businessinsider.com/we-can-thank-transfer-payments-for-gdp-recovery-
2010-12?IR=T. Economics A-Z terms beginning with T, THE ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/
economics-a-to-z/t#node-21529382 [https://perma.cc/LY42-XDXU] (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). The
first-order effects of transfer payments are zero-sum. There may be near-term and positive second-order
effects on GDP via the multiplier effect, if income is transferred from those less likely to spend it to poorer
people who are more likely to spend it on goods and services.
124. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 150 n.248 (2011) (citing an OMB circular that instructs agencies
to not consider transfer payments when conducting a regulatory impact analysis).
125 See Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 36-37. Crain & Hopkins (2001), supra note 113,
at 11.
126 Hahn & Hird (1991), supra note 115, at 249. Hahn & Hird also note that their analysis differed
from prior, and higher, estimates of economic regulatory costs because (a) their analysis reflected
significant deregulatory measures enacted since those estimates were made and (b) "our analysis attempts
to separate efficiency costs from transfers more carefully." Id. at 250 (emphasis added). As Hahn & Hird
observe: "Our 'bottom line' estimate of the net costs of economic regulation is roughly $46 billion, as the
total in Table 1 shows. Annual transfer payments, which we estimate to be between $172.1 billion and
$209.5 billion, are much higher." Hahn & Hird (1991), supra note 115, at 249.
127. See id. at 237 n.51 ("Transfer payments are a redistribution of benefits from one group to
another that has no impact on total economic output.").
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What is the more likely cost of economic regulation, based on more or less
credible studies that actually undertake analysis opposed to snatching numbers
uncritically from other studies? Hahn and Hird noted that their analysis included
several sectors-such as agricultural price supports, trade barriers postal rate
regulation, and telecommunications-that prior studies had excluded. They
observed that if these added sectors are excluded, "the efficiency costs of the
remaining regulations fall to between $7.2 billion and $8.5 billion (in 1988
dollars)."12 8 Given that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (which had
supported prior estimates) passed after the 1991 Hahn and Hird analysis, and that
agricultural price supports and trade barriers are accounted for separately in
Crews analysis,129 it would appear that the Hahn and Hird study yields, at its
upper end, an estimate that is directly comparable to, but dramatically lower than,
the Crews figure: $8.5 billion in 1988 dollars, or $16.81 billion in 2013
dollars.130 That more plausible figure is roughly 4 percent of the "legacy
economic regulation cost" of the $400 billion figure offered by Crews.'31
In short, Crews's estimate of cost to GDP of legacy economic regulation
turns out to be mostly a chimera. Yet the lay reader could be forgiven for giving
it credence. It is explained at length with an impressive number of footnotes. It
is supported by links to charts and tables. The problem-which one discovers
only after following a long trail-is that the footnotes lead ultimately to a dead
end.
As is his custom in Costberg, Crews takes pains to make his estimate seem
plausible by showing that it is lower than other estimates: in this case, he points
to a higher estimate by OMB and another study produced by two academics. 132
The difficulty here, as elsewhere, is that the higher estimates he chooses as
reference points are themselves bogus benchmarks. The "OMB estimate" to
which Crews refers was disavowed by OMB itself in 2002 in response to
128. Hahn& Hird(1991),supranote 115, at250.
129. See Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34, at rows 21-24 (agricultural price supports).
130. Hahn & Hird (1991), supra note 115, at 250. The $8.5 billion figure mentioned there is adjusted
from 1988 to 2013 dollars by multiplying $8.5 billion by 233.5/118, equaling $16.8 billion. The ratio is
derived from the Historical Consumer Price Index for the month of June 2013 (numerator) and 1988
(denominator) as set forth in US Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Detailed Report-April
2014, Table 24, Historical Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), available online at
https://www.bls.gov/cpi/tables/detailed-reports/home.htm.
131. Clearly, Congress has authorized major new regulatory regimes since Hahn & Hird's estimate,
including Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002 and Dodd-Frank in 2010. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-24; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010). But
regulations implementing these more recent acts those are not "legacy" regulations in Crew's parlance.
They are not even "economic regulations" per se in Crews's parlance, and they are separately accounted
for in Costberg and Principia Bureaucratica. See Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34, at rows 102-18.
Crews also accounts for modem telecommunications regulations separately in his table, assigning them a
cost of $2.96 billion for FCC paperwork, $113.69 billion for telecommunications generally, and $15
billion as the cost of net neutrality. Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34, at rows 98-100.
132. Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 37, 40.
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widespread criticism from the expert and scholarly community. 133 The academic
study with which Crews opens his discussion of "baseline" economic regulation
costs-a 2013 study by Dawson and Seater-has not been published and
employs a methodology so improbable that Crews himself seems to disbelieve
it. 134 That study concludes that without federal regulation, "GDP at the end of
2011 would have been $53.9 trillion instead of $15.1 trillion if regulation had
remained at its 1949 level."13 5 The authors reach this improbable result by
regressing per capita GDP growth (dependent variable) against the number of
pages added to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) over a 49-year period
(main variable of interest).136 This statistical estimation technique obviously
depends on the groundless assumption that more pages of CFR somehow
correlates closely and positively with a higher burden.13 7 Crews himself
expresses skepticism of the study two paragraphs after introducing it: "Using
numbers of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations as an independent variable
in creating a proxy for regulatory costs may be problematic, but even if this study
over-shoots, just a fraction of such numbers amounts to an immensity."138
However, the rational response to a clearly outlandish, $54 trillion estimate that
rests on an obviously invalid premise is not to divide it by an unstated and
arbitrary number and call the result an "immensity." The proper response is to
disregard the bogus number.
Having critiqued the Crains' and Crews's approaches to the estimation of
the variously defined "economic regulations," we will turn next to a review of
the sources and methods both studies used to generate their estimates for social
regulations, tax compliance, and homeland security. For these categories of cost,
133. See id. at 36 (referring to "OMB's estimate" of "$487 billion in 2001 dollars or $641 billion if
regarded in 2013 dollars" that is derived from "Table 13 in OMB's 2002 Draft Report to Congress."). See
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS, 67 FED. REG. 15,013, 15,038 (Mar. 28, 2002) [hereinafter OMB Draft Report to Congress
(2002)]. That estimate, again, appeared in the draft report, not in the final report or in any subsequent
OMB annual report. The obvious reason is that it represented an aggregate estimate drawn from old and
unchecked studies of the kind that OMB had vowed to stop using. See detailed discussion of this
development supra Part III.B. 1.
134. See John Dawson & John J. Seater, Federal Regulation and Economic Growth (Jan. 2013)
(unpublished Working Paper). For Crews's incredulous reaction see Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note
30, at 35.
135. Id. at22.
136. See John Dawson & John J. Seater, Federal Regulation and Economic Growth (Jan. 2013)
(unpublished Working Paper).
137. The error of such an assumption can be demonstrated by a simple thought experiment. Imagine
the government issuing, and enforcing, a simple command: "No person or enterprise may pollute air, earth,
or water." That simple and summary edict would eliminate thousands of CFR pages, but it certainly would
not lighten the burden of regulation. Indeed, it most likely would gravely harm the economy. Conversely,
many pages of CFR may be devoted to providing categories and subcategories, waivers, variances, and
other complicating devices in order to lighten the burden by tailoring rules to individual circumstances.
Those extra CFR pages add to the burden as measured by the Dawson and Seater proxy, but in reality they
make the rule less burdensome, not more so. Given its illogical premise and unlikely result, it comes as
no surprise that the paper has not been published in a scholarly joumal to date.
138. See Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 35.
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their estimation methods are similar so we examine the Crains' and Crews's
estimates together.
B. "Social" Regulations
The category of "social" regulation encompasses health, safety, and
environmental regulations enacted by executive branch agencies.139 Within this
category, the Crains tally only EPA and OSHA regulations to yield an estimate
of $401 billion, while Crews sweeps much more broadly to include many other
agency regulatory costs totaling $922 billion.140 Crews's compilation of social
regulatory costs spans thirteen agencies with forty-six entries.14 1 To keep the
discussion manageable, we will focus on the EPA and Department of
Labor/OSHA regulatory cost estimates that the two studies have in common.
These two agencies together account for nearly 60 percent of the social
regulatory costs tallied by Crews and 100 percent of those tallied by the Crains.
This sample thus should fairly reflect and illustrate the methods employed in both
studies.142
The Crain and Crews studies both distinguish between regulatory costs
tallied and reported by OMB before 2002 and those reported by OMB after that
period. The discussion that follows will recognize this dichotomy, focusing first
on legacy (pre-2001) Department of Labor regulations, then legacy (pre-2001)
environmental costs, and finally post-2001 workplace and environmental
regulatory costs, which are estimated by a method common to both.
139. For an explanation of the term, see Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 42. The Crains
do not use the term "social regulation." Their categories are "Economic," "Environmental," "Tax
Compliance" and "OSHHS" (OSHA plus Homeland Security). See Crain (2014) supra note 14, at 40 tbl
6. However, the Crams' "Environmental" and "OSHA" categories are squarely encompassed within the
Crews category of social regulations and we see that they rely on the same or similar sources to estimate
the costs of regulations in these categories, so it is feasible to examine the Crains' and Crews's estimates
concurrently for these cost categories.
140. See Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34, at rows 21-93.
141. Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34, at rows 21-94 (tallying costs for Executive Branch
agencies that submit rules to OMB for review).
142. One threshold issue, unique to the Crain and Crain study, merits mention at this point. We have
seen that the Crains define "economic regulation" uniquely and expansively as all regulation affecting
market activity. See discussion supra note 55 and accompanying text. That definition would include
environmental and workplace regulation. Similarly, business executives responding to the WEF survey
question about the "burden of regulation" clearly would have had environmental and workplace
regulations, among others, in mind. So it is clearly double-counting for the Crains to tally the burdens of
environmental and workplace regulation once under the rubric of "economic regulation" and then again
under the separate rubric of OSHA and EPA regulation. However, since the $1.4 trillion cost estimate for
economic regulation has been shown unreliable in the preceding Part, we strike the $1.4 trillion economic
regulation estimate, andexplore in this Part the question of whether the Crains' separate estimates for the
cost of occupational health and safety and environmental regulations stand on firmer ground.
2018]
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
1. "Legacy" (pre-2001) Department ofLabor Regulations
The Crain and Crews studies both rely on OMB annual reports for the costs
of recent rules, while taking the cost of old rules from prior academic studies
and/or pre-2003 OMB reports that relied on such studies. 14 3 The principal source
of old OSHA rule cost estimates is a 2005 paper prepared by Joseph Johnson,
who had been a Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center from 1999 to 2001 while
preparing the study.144 Johnson's 2005 estimate of $57 billion in 2000 dollars
supplied, when adjusted for inflation, 99 percent of the $71.07 billion of total
OSHA regulatory costs in the Crains' 2014 studyl45 and 93 percent of the total
regulatory costs attributed to the Department of Labor in Crews's 2017 study.] 4 6
The Johnson study begins by summing the ex ante estimated cost of twenty-
five major OSHA rules issued from 1980 through 1993, to yield a total cost of
$7.415 billion. 47 He then does something quite unusual: he multiplies that figure
by a factor of 5.55.148
The multiplier is derived, in turn, from a working paper written in 1996 by
Harvey S. James of the University of Hartford for the Center for the Study of
American Business, and later published in "Policy Sciences."14 9 James began his
analysis by finding a database of OSHA citations for violations of various OSHA
standards from October 1994 to September 1995.150 During this period, OSHA
issued many citations for violations of rules other than the twenty-five major
rules for which an OSHA Regulatory Impact Assessment had been prepared.iS1
In fact, of the 231 specific standards cited at least ten times and up to ninety-nine
times by an OSHA inspector in this period, only forty-four specific standards
came from one of the twenty-five major rules for which a Regulatory Impact
Assessment had been prepared.152 This means that for every major rule standard
that supplied the predicate for ten to ninety-nine violation citations of inspected
143. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 36 n.31.
144. Joseph M. Johnson, A Review and Synthesis of the Cost of Workplace Regulations, CROSS-
BORDER HUMAN RESOURCES, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ISSUES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY 54TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 233, 433 (Andrew P. Morriss & Samuel Estreicher
eds., 2005) [hereinafter, Johnson (2005)].
145. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 37 tbl.4.
146. See Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34, at rows 66, 68 (recording a total of$126.754 billion
in Department of Labor regulatory costs, of which $118.1 billion, in 2014 dollars, is derived from the
Johnson study).
147 Johnson (2005), supra note 144, at 454, 466 tbl. 10.
148. Id. at 454, tbl 5. The "low" estimate of OSHA costs in that table corresponds to a multiplier of
just one, since Johnson had tallied $7.4 billion in costs from the major rules in his dataset. Id. The $41
billion figure (in the "Best" column is derived by multiplying $7.4 billion by 5.5. The "High" figure is
derived by multiplying $7.4 billion by 7.75).
149. Id. (citing to James). See Harvey S. James Jr., Estimating OSHA Compliance Costs, Center for
the Study of American Business, Policy Study Number 135, October 1996, published as Estimating OSHA
Compliance Costs, 31 POLICY SCIENCES 321 (1998) [hereinafter, James (1996)].) Johnson (2005) cites to
the Policy Study, apparently unaware of the published version of the study.
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companies in this sample period, there were roughly 5.5 nonmajor rule standards
cited and 7.75 nonmajor rules for which violation citations were issued one to
nine times in that period.1 5 3
James reasoned that one might approximate total OSHA compliance costs
relative to the cost of major OSHA rules by looking at the ratio of number of
standards derived from nonmajor rules that are mentioned in multiple citations
to the number of standards contained for violations of non-major rules during
OSHA inspections relative to the number of citations involving violations of
major rules. 154 In mathematical terms:
Total Rule Compliance Total No. of Standards with 10-99 OSHA Violations
Major Rule Compliance No. of Major Standards Cited in 10-99 OSHA
The ratio on the right-hand side of the equation derived from the OSHA
database yields the multiplier of 5.5 that Johnson, Crews, and the Crains later
adopted. One could then solve for "Total Rule Compliance Costs" by multiplying
the OMB-tallied costs for the twenty-five major rules by the ratio that appears
on the right-hand side of the equation.
James' approach is ingenious but not sound, because the ratios assumed to
be equal in the above equation are, in fact, not commensurable ratios. There is
no reason to assume these ratios to be equal or even roughly equal. It might be
reasonable to assume, as James does, that companies will comply with a standard
if and only if the cost of compliance with that standard is less than the expected
cost of the noncompliance penalty exacted for violating that standard. 15 5 But
James does not gather information on the cost of the citations, simply the number
of them. Without information on the (expected) size of each violation penalty,
the mere number of OSHA citations to a standard does not support any valid
inference about the likely cost of complying with it.156
How great is the error imparted by this use of a baseless multiplier? That is
hard to know. The error is probably not a full factor of 5.5, since many companies
probably do spend something to comply with "minor" rules not tallied in annual
OMB reports. But it is simply not accurate to pretend that we know, even
approximately, how much they spend. That did not prevent Johnson from
adopting a baseless five-fold multiplier to yield inflated estimates that the Crains
and Crews propagated without correction into high-profile reports two decades
later, reports behind a figure the President and Congress would take on faith.
153. Id. at 331.
154. Id. at 330.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 331. Moreover, the reader may recall that the Crain and Crews studies justified the use of
high-end ex ante estimates in part by reference to the fact that existing cost tallies include only major
rules. If using high-end point source estimates is to be justified by reference to the fact that minor rules
are omitted from the tally, it seems hardly appropriate to then turn around and use a five-fold multiplier
to account for the cost of minor rules in the case of OSHA. See Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at
43. But this is a minor objection in comparison to the fundamental methodological objection noted above.
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2. "Legacy" (pre-2001) EPA Rules
Of the $320 billion in compliance costs that Crews assigns to EPA as
"OMB" reported, 62 percent ($252 billion) are attributed to rules issued more
than fifteen years ago (pre-2001).15 7 Nearly half of Crews's estimate for EPA
costs ($152 billion out of $320 billion in 2013 dollars) is derived from a pre-2002
OMB report citing a single study, by Hahn and Hird, published in 1991,
estimating the cost of EPA rules issued prior to 1988.158 The Crains likewise rely
on the Hahn and Hird study to supply about half of their $330 billion cost
estimate for EPA rules.] 59
But Hahn and Hird do not undertake a careful analysis of the costs and
benefits of pre-1988 EPA regulations. They simply snatch a number from prior
studies to supply a range of figures for environmental regulatory costs and
benefits. The study that provides the upper bound of their range is Hazilla and
Kopp (1990), which offers a figure of $77.6 billion in 1988 dollars, or $157
billion in 2014 dollars. 160
157. Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34, at row 80.
158. Id. ("EPA historical cost per OMB"). Hahn & Hird (1991), supra note 115. The trail back in
time from Crews through OMB to Hahn & Hird is a convoluted and intricate one that clearly illustrates
the pattern of number snatching discussed above. Crews derives his 2017 estimate for ongoing costs
arising from "legacy social regulations" (regulations issued prior to 2002) from an OMB report in 2001,
which lifted its number from an earlier OMB report in 2000, which lifted its number from Hahn & Hird.
Following is that same chain of derivation with citations supplied: Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34,
at row 80 cites as the source for the $252 billion estimate of "EPA historical cost per OMB" a Crews-
authored spreadsheet entitled "OMB-Tallied Social Regulation Subset Costs up to $480 Billion
Annually," available online at http://bit.ly/lwpQTrm. [https://perma.cc/WV6H-XMHB]. That table
contains the $252 billion figure for EPA pre-2002 rule costs along with a note stating that the figure is
taken from "OMB 2002, Table 2's figure of$170 billion" adjusted for inflation to 2013 dollars. However,
Table 2 of OMB 2002 is irrelevant. Crews must mean Table 2 of OMB, 2001 OMB Annual Report. See
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, MAKING SENSE OF REGULATION: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL
ENTITIES TO CONGRESS (2001), at 11 tbl.2 [hereinafter OMB (2001)]. Table 2 of the OMB 2001 Report
to Congress, in turn, cites the 2000 Report Tables 1-4 as its source. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 22 (2000). The 2000
OMB Report, in turn, cites to "Hahn & Hird (1991)" as one of its sources, and offers a range of costs for
"social" regulations issued prior to 1988. The upper end of that range ($140 billion in 1996 dollars)
corresponds exactly to the upper end of the range estimated by Hahn & Hird for all social regulations
(labor, environment, transportation) together. See OMB Report to Congress (2000), at 19-20 (citing Hahn
& Hird (1991), supra note 115, at 253, 256). From this we can surmise that the Hahn & Hird study must
have been the source for the upper end of the range of cost estimates appearing in the 2000 OMB Report,
and the 2001 OMB Report that was cited (or meant to be cited) in Crews's study. Crain (2014) confirms
that the 2001 OMB Report to Congress relies on Hahn & Hird (1991). See Crain (2014), supra note 14, at
34-35.
159. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 35 (indicating that their estimate of the costs of rules issued
through 2000 are derived from OMB's 2001 annual report to Congress on the costs and benefits of federal
regulation, a report which, as the authors explain, "takes the Hahn & Hird (1991) [estimate] as its
beginning estimate of the costs prior to 1988").
160. Hahn & Hird (1991), supra note 115, at 256 tbl.2, 272 (noting that "Hazilla and Kopp... find
significantly higher costs of $77.6 billion"). The calculation for inflation adjustment is 77.6 x 237/117 =
$ 157 billion. See Michael Hazilla & Raymond J. Kopp, Social Cost of Environmental Quality
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The only careful and systematic evaluation of Hazilla and Kopp's
methodology published to date, by Heinzerling and Ackerman, does not inspire
confidence in the Hazilla and Kopp study.16 1 Once again, Hazilla and Kopp do
not add up the compliance costs of individual rules. 16 2 Nor do they employ
statistical regression techniques like the Crains would later employ for
"economic regulations."1 63 Instead, Hazilla and Kopp derive their cost estimate
from yet a third analytical technique, involving "general equilibrium"
macroeconomic modeling.164 General equilibrium analysis entails an effort to
simulate the operation of an entire economy with a simplified and stylized
mathematical model of that economy. 165 The benefit of general equilibrium
models is that they enable researchers to explore in a rigorous, mathematical
fashion the likely economic consequences of changes to key parameters-
whether in the form of exogenous shocks or policy interventions. To be useful,
however, the model must faithfully reflect the basic cause-and-effect
relationships that, in fact, determine the path of the economy in response to a
shock.
In their 2012 critique, Heinzerling and Ackerman demonstrated that the
model employed by Hazilla and Kopp failed this basic test. According to these
critics, the principal (imagined) mechanism of action built into the Hazilla and
Kopp model is federal regulations increasing prices of goods.1 66 This regulation-
induced inflation in the price of goods decreases real wages, which (somehow)
induces workers to choose marginally more leisure over work, thus reducing
GDP.167 This strange model simply assumes that workers are able to choose
precisely how many hours they will work at any given wage and price level. And
it assumes that workers respond to marginally higher prices by working less, not
more. These are unsubstantiated and counterintuitive assumptions.16 8 The
Hazilla and Kopp model also assumes that regulations never increase
productivity by, for example, saving lives or worker health, thereby enlarging
the earnings and purchases of the workforce. The model also does not allow for
the possibility that regulations might stimulate cost-saving innovation in at least
Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98 J. POL. ECON. 853, at tbl. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Hazilla
& Kopp (1990)].
161. Heinzerling & Ackerman (2012), supra note 17, at 144-150.
162. See Hazilla & Kopp (1990), supra note 160, at 858 tbl.1 (organizing tabulated costs primarily
by the actions and products regulated).
163. Crain (2010), supra note 96, at 18.
164. Hazilla & Kopp, supra note 160, at 857-60.
165. For an overview and example of computable general equilibrium modeling in action, see, e.g.,
Kenneth W. Clements, A General Equilibrium Econometric Model of the Open Economy, 21 INT'L ECON.
REV. 469, 469-88 (Jun. 1980). For a critique of the methodology, see Frank Ackerman, Still dead after
all these years: interpreting the failure of general equilibrium theory, 9 J. OF ECON. METHODOLOGY 119
(2002).
166. Heinzerling & Ackerman (2012), supra note 17, at 146.
167. Id. at 145-46; Hazilla & Kopp, supra note 160, at 857-58, 866-67, 870.
168. Heinzerling & Ackerman (2012), supra note 17, at 855.
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some cases. 169 Heinzerling and Ackerman also demonstrated that the model's
improbable core assumptions of productivity losses without compensating
corrections means that modeled GDP losses increase exponentially and without
limit over time to clearly incredible levels. 170
Hahn and Hird themselves were skeptical of the Hazilla and Kopp results.
They noted that general equilibrium analyses (as practiced then) incorrectly
assume the economy is perfectly competitive, do not take account of
macroeconomic benefits of regulation, are very difficult to validate or even
understand, and are extraordinarily nontransparent. 171 For all these reasons, they
regarded the Hazilla and Kopp analysis as an exercise in a mode of analysis still
in its "infancy."] 72 They reported Hazilla and Kopp's results only as one estimate
at the high end of a range of estimates obtained by other means.1 73
That did not prevent the Hazilla and Kopp figure from being used to
establish the upper bound of cost ranges in OMB reports through mid-2002, at
which point OMB officially decided to stop relying on such studies.] 74 Nor did
it prevent the Crains from relying on Hazilla and Kopp's figure as the cost of
pre-1988 environmental regulations in their 2010 report. Even the searching
critique of that figure published by Heinzerling and Ackerman in 2012 did not
deter the Crains from going back to the same discredited study as the source of
their estimate for the costs of federal regulations promulgated prior to 1988, built
into their 2014 report. Nor has it deterred Crews from adopting Hazilla and
Kopp's number every year in his annual updates of Costberg and Ten Thousand
Commandments. Once again, we see that falsehood flies and the truth comes
limping after.
3. Labor and EPA Rules Post-2001
Each year since 1995, OMB compiles and publishes a draft and then a final
report to Congress on the agency-estimated costs and benefits of all economically
significant and new regulations that took effect the prior year.17 5 For rules issued
169. Id. at 148. For evidence of innovation-stimulating and cost-saving dimension of certain
regulations, see Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, 9 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 97-118 (Autumn,
1995).
170. The assumption of inexorable decline in productivity as a result of regulation leads to a
prediction of exponentially increasing regulatory costs from foregone growth, such that the cost of early-
1980s regulations would climb to $4.5 trillion by 2009 (nearly a third of GDP) and continue mounting
thereafter, clearly an absurd result. Id.
171. Hahn & Hird (1991), supra note 115, at 245.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 256 tbl.2 (offering a range of environmental costs from $55.4 billion to $77.6 billion in
1988 dollars, or $109 billion to $152 billion in 2013 dollars, using a 2013/1988 inflation adjustment factor
of 1.97). See DEP'T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., CPI DETAILED REPORT: DATA FOR APRIL 2014, at
72 tbl.24 ("Historical Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers" (2014)).
174. See discussion infra Part IV.
175. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, INFORMING
REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 6 (2003).
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after 2001, both the Crain and Crews studies simply add up the high-end figures
for the estimated cost of rules tallied each year in OMB's Annual Report to
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation.176 This yields a total
of $180 billion in compliance costs for such rules in Crews's compilation of costs
for all Executive Branch agencies.' 77 Of this amount, $68 billion in post-2001
costs are attributed to EPA and $9,billion to Department of Labor.17 8
Adding up annual estimates of the cost of new rules issued each year would
appear to be straightforward: a simple process of arithmetic. Nonetheless,
Heinzerling and Ackerman have documented at least five significant pitfalls with
this approach.' 79
First, they note that the Crains (and by implication OMB reports) include
the cost of certain rules that were never put into effect because EPA chose to
reconsider them after they appeared in the OMB report. This category accounts
for almost $11 billion in overstated costs. 180
Second, the practice of simply tallying OMB-reported costs necessarily will
include the cost of rules that are repealed because courts overturned them.
Heimzerling and Ackerman's review identified costs of nearly $6 billion
attributed to rules that were no longer in effect because they had been overturned
by courts.1 8 1
Third, EPA's National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) are
assigned an estimated compliance cost in OMB reporting when they are
promulgated, even though they do not actually impose any cost on particular
polluters until implementing regulations are enacted for the purpose of bringing
"Economically significant" regulatory actions are those expected to cost more than $100 million per year
to comply with. See Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Oct. 4, 1993).
176. See Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34, at row 163 (reporting $140 billion in costs for rules
for which agencies monetized both costs and benefits) and row 164 (reporting $39.72 billion in costs for
rules for which agency RIA monetize only costs). These two categories together thus add to $180 billion.
See also Crews, "OMB-Tallied Social Regulation Subset Costs up to $480 Billion Annually," chart
available online at http://bit.l¥/l wpOTrm (itemizing figures representing the high-end of range of OMB-
reported costs for all Executive Branch agencies from the 2002 OMB Report to the 2016 OMB Draft
Report, for rules for which both costs and benefits are monetized. These costs total $140 billion,
corresponding to the $140 billion that appears in Row 163 of Principia Bureaucratica). See also Crain
(2014), supra note 14, at 35 ("the costs of newly reviewed regulations are taken from OMB's annual
reports for 2002 through 2014.").
177. Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34 at rows 162 and 163.
178. Id. at rows 81 and 82 (EPA rules post-2001); rows 64 and 65 (DOL rules post-2001). The sum
of figures in the EPA column for the 2002 Report through Draft 2016 report comes to $68 billion. The
"Labor" column in the same table sums to $9 billion in costs. Id. This is for the entire Department of
Labor, not just OSHA (the focus of the Crams' analysis). Note that the $68 billion for post-2001 costs
cited is for "OMB-sourced" costs. It does not include the $73 billion in wholly speculative costs assigned
to the Congressionally-mandated, EPA-administered ethanol program. These costs are tallied in the
"Crews Mods and Supplements" column. Limitations of space do not permit an investigation of the bona
fides of these cost estimates, but their listing as "Crews Mods and Supplements" is a candid
acknowledgement of their, shall we say, "unofficial" character. Id.
179. Heinzerling & Ackerman (2012), supra note 17, at 138; Shapiro (2011), supra note 17, at 4-6.
180. Heinzerling & Ackerman (2012), supra note 17, at 152-53.
181. Id. at 153.
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nonattainment areas into compliance with such standards. 182 Once implementing
regulations go into effect years later, the estimated cost of complying with those
implementing regulations is substituted in that year's OMB accounting for the
prior estimated cost of the NAAQS standard going forward. 183 OMB recognizes
that this substitution is necessary in order to avoid double counting.184 The
Crews's and Crains' practice of simply adding up all OMB historic regulatory
cost estimates without substitution and assuming that such costs apply to all years
going forward is simply erroneous. 185 Heinzerling and Ackerman found that this
error alone accounts for at least an additional $10 billion annually in double-
counted phantom costs. 186
Together, Heinzerling and Ackerman found $30 billion in phantom costs
generated by these errors through 2010, at which point they stopped counting.187
Fourth, tabulating only OMB-reported costs of brand new rules necessarily
includes in the estimate a potentially large category of transition and start-up
costs that will diminish in later years as initial investments in capital and
compliance management systems are amortized over time. A good illustration of
the last category of phantom costs to which Heinzerling and Ackerman refer is
the unleaded gas rule, which banned the sale of leaded gas beginning in 1996,
and required gas stations to phase out the sale of leaded gas nationwide. 88 That
transition was enormously expensive when it happened, and the high cost of
making that transition was reflected in the impact assessment for that rule. 189 But
182. See, e.g., OMB 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 36 (2007).
183. Id.
184. See OMB 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 13 (2015)
("We note also that EPA's 2006 National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for particulate matter,
with estimated benefits ranging from $4 billion to $40 billion per year and estimated costs of $3 billion
per year (2001$), is excluded from the 10-year aggregate estimates or the year-by-year estimates. The
reason for the exclusion is to prevent double-counting: EPA finalized implementing rules, such as the
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, that will achieve emission reductions and impose costs that account for a
major portion of the benefit and cost estimates associated with this NAAQS rule. The benefit and cost
estimates for lead NAAQS, S02 NAAQS, and 2008 Ozone NAAQS may also be dropped in the future
reports to avoid double counting to the extent that EPA publishes implementing regulations that would be
designed to achieve the emissions reductions required by these NAAQS.").
185. See Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34, at row 80, citing CHART: "OMB-Tallied Social
Regulation Subset Costs up to $480 Billion Annually," available online at http://bit.ly/lwpQTrm
[https://perma.cc/MHZ9-HMKR] (temizing figures representing the high-end of range of OMB-reported
costs for all Executive Branch agencies from 2002 OMB report to the 2016 OMB Draft Report). See also
Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 35 ("the costs of newly reviewed regulations are taken from OMB's annual
reports for 2002 through 2014.").
186. Heinzerling & Ackerman (2012), supra note 17, at 154.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 149 n.92.
189. EPA, Costs and Benefits of Reducing Lead in Gasoline: Final Regulatory Impact Analysis,
EPA-230-05-85-006 at E-3 (Feb. 1985) ("Our base case results suggest that the final rule will cost less
than $100 million for the second half of 1985, when the 0.50 gplg limit will apply. For later years, when
the 0.10 gplg limit will apply, the estimated costs range from $608 million in 1986 to $441 million in
1992.").
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now that all cars are designed to burn unleaded gas and all gas is unleaded, the
ongoing cost of complying with the unleaded gas rule is nearly zero, while the
health benefits remain enormous. 190 The practice of simply toting up OMB
reported costs would report the ex ante estimate of the cost of the unleaded gas
rule, including the amortized transition cost, as the ongoing cost of that rule in
perpetuity. This is erroneous accounting.191
Fifth, while OMB routinely reports a range of cost and benefits estimates,
the Crain and Crews studies tally only the high end of the cost range. They justify
this practice by observing that "cost estimates are absent for important
environmental regulations and... government agencies may be conservative in
estimating regulatory costs." 192 This excuse, however, itself faces three major
objections:
First, it violates established protocols for reporting uncertain results. OMB
reported costs are ex ante guesses by agencies about what the future compliance
costs of a given regulation are likely to be. Citing such predictions as actual costs
of regulation is much like equating day-before predictions about the score of an
upcoming Super Bowl with the actual score of the game. 193 Whether the issue is
reporting of cancer risk, environmental risk, or regulatory cost-benefit analysis
generally, sound practice codified in both National Academy of Sciences and
OMB guidelines calls for analysts to acknowledge uncertainties candidly in their
analysis, and to state their estimates in the form of ranges that reflect the
sensitivity of the analysis to plausible variations in all uncertain parameters.' 94
Second, it is not clear that agencies systematically underestimate the future
costs of their regulations. Controversy has raged for years about whether ex ante
estimates of cost are likely to understate or overstate costs. 195 What little
190. In the case of the phase-out of leaded gasoline, compliance costs were further reduced by the
fact that leaded gasoline had to be phased out in any case, because it would destroy the catalytic converters
in the new generation of cars equipped with catalytic converters. Id. at VI-5.
191. Id. at 149. Heinzerling and Ackerman use this example to illustrate the so-called "Porter
hypothesis," which holds that regulation can stimulate research and innovation that reduces cost and may,
in some case, actually yield cost saving. Heinzerling & Ackerman (2012), supra note 17, at 149. In the
view of this author, however, the unleaded gas example actually illustrates a more basic and universal
aspect of regulatory cost accounting: even in the absence of cost-saving innovation, start-up costs of the
transition to compliance would be expected to exceed steady-state compliance costs later on, sometimes
by orders of magnitude.
192. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 36. See also Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 43.
193. For a detailed discussion of the fallacy of conflating ex ante predictions with actual costs and
benefits, see Richard Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CH1. L. REV. 1345, 1367-70 (2003).
194. THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., REPORT IN BRIEF: SCIENCE AND DECISIONS: ADVANCING RISK
ASSESSMENT 2-3 (2008), available athttps://www.nap.edu/resource/12209/IRA brief final.pdf; see, e.g.,
Memorandum from Shaun Donovan, Director of the Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads of Exec.
Dep't & Agencies, on OMB Circular No. A-123, Management's Responsibility for Enterprise Risk
Management and Internal Control at 9-10 (July 15, 2016) (available at https://www.whitehouse.gov
/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2016/m-16-17.pdf).
195. Compare Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 44,73, 83; Crews, Commandments (2016),
supra note 15, at 10; Crain (2010), supra note 96, at 15-16; andCrain (2014), supra note 14, at 27, 29 &
n.31, with David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 387-90, 399
(2006); Thomas 0. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental
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empirical evidence exists on this point has produced decidedly ambiguous
results. In 1999, Resources for the Future-an independent nonprofit research
organization-conducted one of the few studies to actually compare ex ante
regulatory cost and benefits prediction with ex post experience. They found
examples of both over- and underestimation, with overestimates of costs
outnumbering underestimates by fourteen to three, along with eleven cases of
more-or-less accurate predictions.196 In 2005, 0MB reported the results of its
own survey of expost reviews of impacts compared to ex ante estimates. It, too,
found that overestimates of cost outnumber underestimates, though the study
found that benefits of the regulations tend to be overestimated as well.197
Nor is it clear, contrary to the Crains' assumption, that minor rules not
tallied in OMB reports add such significant costs that they warrant reporting only
the high-end estimates of the cost of major rules. This author is not aware of any
study supporting that proposition empirically, and the assumed equation of
another rule with an additional burden becomes implausible a priori once one
recognizes that minor rules do not necessarily add burden, or even minor burden.
Many rules simply clarify or make technical corrections or minor tweaks to the
existing rules.198 Some rules reduce burden. 199 No doubt there are some-
Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2005, 2020, 2026, 2037, 2042-43, 2048-49 (2002); Heinzerling &
Ackerman (2012), supra note 17, at 130, 150; and Shapiro (2011), supra note 17, at 7.
196. Winston Harrington et al., On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates 2 (Resources for the
Future, Discussion Paper 99-18, 1999), http://www.rff.org/CFDOCS/discpapers/PDF files/9918.pdf
(visited May 6, 2003). See also William D. Nordhaus, From Porcopolis to Carbopolis: The Evolution
from Pork Bellies to Emissions Trading, in EMISSIONS TRADING: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY'S NEW
APPROACH 61, 66 (Richard F. Kosobud, ed., John Wiley & Sons 2000) (noting that while sulfur dioxide
reduction costs were overestimated, chlorofluorocarbon control costs were under-estimated, while
numerous post hoc reviews revealed that ex ante estimates over-stated both costs and benefits by assuming
higher compliance rates than actually materialized).
197. OMB reported sixteen cases of cost overestimates, twelve cases of cost underestimates, and
twelve cases of "accurate" estimates, defined as ex post estimated compliance cost within twenty-five
percent of ex ante estimated compliance cost, and seven cases in which costs were not estimated. OMB
found, however, that overestimates of benefits were even more pronounced, with overestimates appearing
in forty percent of final rules compared to only four percent of rules in which benefits were
underestimated. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE,
LOCAL AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 47 tbl.3-2 (2005) [hereinafter, OMB Report (2005)]. For an excellent
analysis of the estimation problem and the methodological issues confronting cost estimation and cost
estimate validation efforts, see Frank Ackerman, The Unbearable Lightness of Regulatory Costs, 33
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1071 (2006).
198. See, e.g., Dept. of Ag., "Golden Nematode; Removal of Regulated Areas in Orleans, Nassau,
and Suffolk Counties," New York, 80 Fed. Reg. 59,551 (Oct. 2, 2015). Other rules are procedural and
record-keeping adjustments. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Adoption of Updated EDGAR Filer
Manual, 80 Fed. Reg. 59, 578 (Oct. 2, 2015). Others are simply trivial: See Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric
Admin., Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic; Reef Fish Fishery of the Gulf of
Mexico; 2015 Recreational Accountability Measure and Closure for Red Grouper, 80 Fed. Reg. 59665
(Oct. 2, 2015).
199. For a good example of the latter, consider the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's) recent
rewrite of its rule on airworthiness certification of small aircraft during the Obama Administration. 14
C.F.R §23.1 et. seq. The aviation industry is delighted. See CFSJets webpage, "FAA Rewrite of Part 23
Certification Rules" at http://cfsjets.com/2017/05/05/faa-rewrite-of-part-23-certification-rules/ ("It took
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perhaps many-rules that add untallied burdens. But they coexist in the law
alongside a host of rule amendments, guidelines, waivers, and exceptions that
may be issued simply to clarify the law, make technical corrections, or ease the
burden of regulation. In sum, the issue of whether the body of untallied minor
rules adds more burden overall than it subtracts is an open question, the answer
to which cannot be simply assumed.
Finally, the importance of tallying only costs of rules and requirements that
actually exist will be magnified manyfold going forward, since the Trump
Administration is now in the process of rescinding many of the allegedly costly
rules or regulatory requirements that appear in previous OMB reports. 20 0
Whatever the argument for the adding-up approach in the past, it is certainly no
longer feasible going forward.
C. Tax Compliance and Homeland Security
As seen in Table 1 above, the Crains pad their regulatory cost estimates with
$159 billion of "tax compliance" costs and $21 billion of homeland security
compliance requirements for a total of $180 billion for the two categories
combined.2 0 1 Crews adds $316 billion in costs for tax compliance and $57 billion
for homeland security for a combined total of $373 billion of added costs. 2 02
These numbers are termed "padding" because they arguably do not belong
in the regulatory cost tally at all. To begin with, tax compliance and homeland
security regulations serve purposes-raising revenue and providing security in
travel-that are quite distinct from the main purposes of social regulations
(controlling externalities) and classic economic regulations (limiting price and
entry to prevent abuse of monopoly power). It is a categorical mistake to lump
all these disparate items together in a single basket of regulatory costs as if they
were one thing. Second, tax requirements are uniquely creatures of Congress,
and leave relatively little room for agency discretion.2 03 These costs therefore
have little relevance to the calculation of a figure used in regulatory debates as
an index of agency overreach. Third, it will be seen that both homeland security
nine years to accomplish, but those of us who fly small airplanes are thrilled with the recent FAA rewrite
of Part 23 certification rules. The new regulations significantly streamline the testing and documentation
necessary for certifying smaller airplanes, and also for approving updates to their systems.").
200. See discussion supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text.
201. See supra Table 1.
202. Id.
203. James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax, 114 MICH. L. REV. 235, 248 (2015) ("It
is commonly understood that U.S. tax policy is, to a remarkable (and unusual) extent, determined by
Congress not only in its broad outlines but also in its details. Congress enacts the statutes that together
comprise the [Internal Revenue Code] IRC. The IRC defines the tax base and sets tax rates, which together
determine each taxpayer's liability. The IRC contains lengthy and detailed definitions of most of the key
terms in the federal tax laws, usually leaving only a modest amount of substance to be decided by the
Treasury Department and the IRS, although there are exceptions, some noted below. Thus, although
Congress often delegates authority to the Treasury Department, in the vast majority of cases the
regulations and other guidance produced by Treasury serve the function of interpreting or filling in the
gaps of an already very detailed IRC.").
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and tax costs in the Crews's and Crains' tallies count as a reduction to GDP due
to the monetized value of personal time spent preparing one's own tax returns or
standing in line for security at the airport.204 While time spent standing in airport
security lines or filling out tax forms may be annoying and a nuisance, neither
the Crains, nor Crews, nor the authors they cite, provide any evidence that such
time reduces GDP. 205 They simply assume that result.2 06 Moreover, if we are
going to start counting time spent standing in airport security lines and filling out
tax forms as costs to GDP, then we also need to count the cost to GDP of having
no tax code (hence no government) and the cost to GDP of having no airport
screening (hence no airport security). In sum, "regulatory cost" is being hailed,
or derided, as a $2 trillion cost to GDP which critics lay at the doorstep of an
overzealous administrative state. If that is the context, these tax compliance and
homeland security numbers do not belong in the tally.
Nonetheless, they are in the tally for both the Crain and Crews studies and
it is therefore necessary to look at least briefly at the sources and methods used
to derive them. Those sources and methods illustrate once again the habit of
unexamined "number-snatching" that we have seen in other contexts.
1. Tax Compliance Costs
Both the Crain and Crews studies estimate tax compliance costs by
tabulating official Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates for time spent per
tax form.20 7 They multiply this figure by the total number of forms filed with the
IRS, as reported by the IRS.208 They then multiply that figure by an hourly rate
that the Crains say they derive from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) statistics
and that Crews simply makes up.2 0 9 These assumptions and calculations are
summarized in Table 3 below:
204. See Crain (2014) supra note 14, at 40, tbl.6; Crews, Costberg (2017) supra note 30, at 49-51
(tax), 72-77 (homeland security).
205. See discussion infra Parts III.C. 1-2.
206. Id.
207. Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 55 56; Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 39.
208. Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 57; Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 39.
209. Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 56 (assuming, without justification, a paperwork
hours cost of $43 per hour); Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 39.
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Table 3
Estimated Costs of Compliance with the Federal Tax Code,
Crain and Crews Estimates
Crain210  Businesses Individuals/ Total
Nonprofits
Number of Hours Required to 2.64 1.58 4.2
Comply (billion)
Compliance Cost per Hour in 2014 $48.80 $31.51 N/A
Dollars
Total Compliance Cost in billion $109 $50 $159
2014 Dollars
Crews211
umber of Hours Required to No separate No separate 7.36
Comply (billion) estimate estimate
Compliance Cost per Hour in 2014 No separate No separate $43
Dollars estimate estimate
Total Compliance Cost in billion No separate No separate $316
-014 Dollars estimate estimate
A moment's reflection and a modicum of research (with some back-of-the-
envelope checking) would have revealed that these numbers, particularly
Crews's numbers, are not credible. Simple arithmetic indicates that 7.36 billion
hours (Crews's estimate) corresponds to the hours that would be logged by
3,675,000 accountants working 2000 hours per year (fifty weeks per year and
forty hours per week) doing nothing but filling out IRS paperwork or preparing
to do so. Yet the BLS records only 70,000 professional tax preparers in the work
place, and 337,720 workers in the larger category of "Accounting, Tax
Preparation, Bookkeeping and Payroll services," a category which obviously
includes much more than tax-related work.2 12 Even if each person in this larger
category works 2000 hours per year on nothing but tax compliance-an
assumption that unrealistically favors the Crews position-337,700 workers
each working 2000 hours per year will generate at most 675 million hours of paid
work.
Suppose one assumes, again giving Crews and the Crains the benefit of the
doubt, that all of the aforementioned accounting and payroll professionals
counted in BLS statistics work only on business and nonprofit tax returns and
that none of them work on individual returns. That means we must tabulate the
210. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 39 tbl.5.
211. Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 50-51.
212. See BLS, Occupational Employment and Wages, 13-2082: Tax Preparers (May 2016),
available online at https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oesl32082.htm#ind [https://perma.cc/K26K-9H7P];
and BLS Occupational Employment Statistics, Occupational Employment and Wages, 13-2011




hours spent on individual return preparation separately, recognizing that many
individual tax returns are self-prepared by taxpayers themselves. The IRS 2017
Instruction for Form 1040 states that "[t]he estimated average time burden for all
taxpayers filing a Form 1040, Form 1040A, or 1040EZ is [twelve] hours, with
an average cost of $210 per return. The average includes all associated forms and
schedules, across all preparation methods and taxpayer activities." 2 13 If this very
public and prominent IRS estimate is roughly accurate, we should multiply the
estimated average time of twelve hours by the 151.57 million individual tax
return filings in 2017 to yield a total of 1.855 billion hours.
Adding 1.855 billion hours (individuals) to 0.675 billion hours (corporate
and nonprofit) yields a total of 2.5 billion hours as an absolute upper bound on
the number of hours that can be credibly attributed to the preparation and filing
of federal taxes. This figure is a little more than half the Crains' estimate and a
bit more than a third of the Crews estimate.
How did the Crains and (particularly) Crews stray so wildly from the path
of credibility in their estimates of person-hours devoted to taxes? Since Crews
offers more detail about his ultimate sources than the Crains, we will focus on
the Crews method. Crews says he derived his 7.35 billion hour figure from the
OIRA Information Collection Budget (1CB) that is posted online. 2 14 That
estimate, however, is for all of Treasury Department forms, not just IRS forms,
though the latter probably account for the bulk of the hours.2 15
More important, the ICB is known to be an unreliable source. As the GAO
has noted, "[m]any analysts within Treasury and outside believe that the ICB
estimates are not very accurate." 2 16 One major problem is that the ICB tabulates
its hours estimate by number of forms filled out, but the typical itemized tax
return includes multiple subsidiary forms.2 17 No sustained effort is made to
indicate which forms are subsumed in other forms or return estimates to avoid
double counting. 2 18 Under these circumstances, simply adding (a) the total hours
attributed to the overall return to (b) the hours associated with producing each
213. IRS 2018 Instruction, Form 1040, at 100, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040gi.pdf.
214. Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 48.
215. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, INFORMATION
COLLECTION BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 8 (2016), available online at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/defaut/files/omb/inforeg/icb/icb 201 6.pdf.
216. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, TAX
POLICY: SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES OF THE COSTS OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 11 (Aug. 2005)
[hereinafter GAO 2005 Report].
217. See OFFICE OF INFO. AND REG. AFFAIRS (OIRA), INVENTORY OF CURRENTLY APPROVED
INFORMATION COLLECTIONS, TREASURY DEP'T, Feb. 27, 2018, available online at
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain [https://perma.cc/K3KZ-9SGV] [hereinafter OIRA
Reginfo Inventory] (tallying costs by form).
218. For example, the OIRA Reginfo Inventory tallies the estimated hours required to fill out an
individual tax return separately from all the other Schedules (such as Schedule A and C etc.) that go into
the typical itemized return. Id.
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included form, will result in counting the same hours twice and perhaps multiple
times. 2 19
Additionally, GAO's 2005 report to Congress on this topic offers a sobering
account of the difficulties facing attempts to compile any estimate of the cost
associated with tax-related paperwork.220 One problem for estimation (though a
blessing for taxpayers) is that tax preparation is becoming increasingly
automated, which saves labor and thus counteracts some of the cost impact of
rising tax complexity.2 2 1 Indeed, IRS reports that 90 percent of returns were e-
filed in 2016, which suggests that most American taxpayers are using modern
technology in preparing and filing their returns.2 22
Further, taxpayers tend not to keep records of time and money spent on tax
compliance. When asked to recall such time later, they tend to exaggerate.2 23
Moreover, as the GAO explained, many corporate records kept and entered for
tax reasons are gathered and maintained for purposes other than tax filing in the
normal course of business, so attribution of compliance costs alone is difficult.224
Compounding the impact of these sources of error in per-form estimates is
the huge number of forms filed each year. To take just one example: with an
estimated 1.434 billion broker and barter exchange transaction forms filed each
year, every ten minute discrepancy in the estimate of time required to prepare a
Form 1099-B translates into a 239 million hour discrepancy in estimated
compliance hours. This difference, when valued at the Crews hourly rate of $43
219. The Tax Foundation seems to have fallen into this trap with its recent estimate that IRS
paperwork consumes 8.9 billion hours of time. Table I of their study shows that, drawing on the OMB
database, they simply added the time spent on income tax returns to the time spent on the schedules
incorporated within those returns, such as Schedule C: Profit and Loss from Business, etc. Tax Foundation,
Fiscal Fact No. 512, at 3-4 tbl. 1. This obviously double counts hours. It would appear that the OMB's
ICB, with its 7.35 billion hour estimate, makes the same or similar mistake.
220. Id.
221. As a GAO official testified in 2011:
Tax software and the use of paid tax return preparers may mitigate the need for taxpayers to
understand complexities of the tax code. In 2010, IRS processed about 137 million returns...
about 90 percent of returns are prepared by individual taxpayers or paid preparers using
professional or commercial software. Software companies and paid preparers often act as
surrogate tax administrators in that they keep abreast of tax law changes.
Complexity and the Tax Gap: Making Tax Compliance Easier and Collecting what is Due: Hearing Before
the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, 112' Cong. (June 28, 2011) (statement of Michael Brostek).
222. See U.S. Taxpayers e-filed More Than 128 Million Tax Returns in 2016, EFrLE.COM, https://
www.efile.com/efile-tax-retum-direct-deposit-statistics/ [perma.cc/SN53-6JRN] (last visited Feb. 27,
2018) (listing that 92 percent of taxpayers e-filed in 2016).
223. GAO 2005 Report, supra note 216, at 9 n.4 ("As part of the study that forms the basis for IRS's
current estimates of compliance costs, the study's authors used two data collection methods-a mail
survey and a diary study. The cost estimates yielded by the two methods varied significantly. The average
burden of 14.8 hours for the mail survey respondents was 78 percent higher than the average burden of
8.3 hours reported by diary respondents."). Assuming that the diaries are accurate records, it would appear
that memory tends to nearly double the time actually spent on this unpleasant task.
224. Id. at 10 ("A major difficulty in measuring compliance costs is disentangling accounting and
recordkeeping costs due to taxes from the costs that would have been incurred in the absence of the federal
tax system.").
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per hour, corresponds to a $10 billion discrepancy in the tax compliance cost
estimate-just for that one rather obscure form. According to the IRS, there were
11 million business returns filed, 152 million individual returns, 254 million W-
2s, and 142 million Form 1099-INTs.225 With multipliers like these, even small
errors in per-form time estimates can quickly cascade into huge discrepancies in
aggregate hours and cost.
If hours estimates are uncertain, per-hour cost estimates are somewhat less
so. Crews quotes BLS as authority for his estimate of $43 per hour, though BLS
source indicates an hourly mean wage of $39.90 for the estimated 323,140
workers in the "Accounting, Tax Preparation, Bookkeeping and Payroll
Services" category.2 26 Assuming, again very conservatively, that every one of
these 323,140 employees works on nothing but taxes for 2000 hours per year at
a $39.90 per hour wage, the entire cost would come to $26 billion per year.
Next, since BLS statistics do not account for self-employed tax preparers,
let us further assume that an equal number of self-employed individuals
(377,000) are each able to bill an average of 1500 hours per year working on
clients' taxes at the same mean hourly rate as their BLS-listed counterparts earn.
That would add another $20 billion to the tab.
Now let us assume, again, that all of the above hours and costs tallied by
paid professionals are solely associated with business and nonprofit taxes, and
that individual taxes are prepared solely by additional people somehow not
included within either the BLS-listed or non-BLS-listed workers. Under this
assumption, these not-previously-accounted-for individuals perform all the
labors for individual tax preparation for which the IRS estimates an average cost
of $210 per return. Applying that charge to each of $157 million individual tax
returns filed in 2016 would add, at most, $33 billion per year to the total cost.
Adding these three categories of cost together yields $79 billion per year, a
figure which employs pessimistic assumptions to yield an upper bound on the
number that can credibly be attributed to tax paperwork cost. That number is half
the Crains' estimate and one-quarter of Crews's estimate.
$79 billion per year is still a very high cost, of course, remembering that
this is just the (upper-bound-estimate of the) cost of tax paperwork. But it is not
credible to suggest that this cost can be fairly attributed to IRS overzealousness.
The tax code as enacted by Congress stands at 6,000 pages and counting.227 Tax
225. Data relevant to Form 1099-B in this paragraph is derived from OIRA 2016 Reginfo Inventory
for Treasury Dep't, available online at https://reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref nbr-201705-
1545-021.
226. See Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 48-49, 51 (citing BLS statistics in his discussion
of the hourly wages of agency employees that ultimately concludes in an estimate of $43 per hour). By
way of comparison, see DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT
AND WAGES, MAY 2017, 13-2011 ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITORS, available at https://perma.cc/DS9G-
V8Y3.
227. Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. (2012). This is based on a PDF of the Code as of January
31, 2018, downloaded on February 9, 2018, from the website of the Office of the Law Revision Counsel
(http://uscode.house.gov/download/download.shtml. [https://perma.ce/5S35-UDHP]).
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reformers have been calling for "tax simplification" for years, always with the
understanding that this is a job mainly for Congress.2 28 The recently passed Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act gave President Trump and his allies the opportunity to make
good on their pledge to simplify the tax code and reduce the time and paperwork
burden that it imposes. 229 They did not make good on that pledge. Whatever else
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act may have done, it did not simplify the tax code, nor
is there any indication that it will reduce the paperwork burden of tax filing.230
The failure of tax code simplification in the most recent tax reform bill
raises the possibility that perhaps interest groups perceive a benefit in tax code
complexity and want more of it-not in the abstract, of course, but in many
individual situations-to provide them with all manner of tax credits, deductions,
and exemptions. That possibility does not prove that tax complexity is either
good or bad. But it does mean that the complexity and burden of tax filing cannot
fairly be laid at the door of agency overzealousness and empire-building. These
paperwork burdens are thanks to Congress and they certainly do not bolster
Crews's argument for more--not less-Congressional micromanagement of the
economy. 23 1
In sum, the upper-bound credible estimate of tax compliance paperwork
burdens is about half the Crains' estimate and one-quarter of Crews's estimate,
and even that figure is not properly included in a tally of costs imposed by agency
discretion. These costs are much more properly seen as artifacts of special
interest lobbying in the corridors of Congress.
228. See, e.g., William G. Gale, Tax Simplification: Issues and Options, TAX NOTES 1463 (Sept. 10,
2001).
229. Chris Isidore, Trump says H&R Block will be unhappy with his tax plan, CNN MONEY (Feb.
15. 2017), http://www.money.cnn.com2017/02/15/pf/taxes/donald-trump-hr-block/index.html
[https://perma.cc/F6AY-SGEC]) (quoting President Trump, "We're going to simplify very greatly the tax
code"); Pres. Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of Financial Services Executive
Orders (Apr. 21, 2017) (transcript available at, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-president-trump-signing-financial-services-executive-orders/ [https://perma.cc/G4N6-HG9Y])
(transcribing remarks of President Trump, "The first executive action instructs Secretary Mnuchin to begin
the process of tax simplification").
230. An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on
the budget for fiscal year 2018, Pub. L No. 115-97 (2017) ("Tax Cuts and Jobs Act"). See also Gene B.
Sperling, The Republican Tax Plan Isn't About Simplification, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/republican s-are-falsely-claiming-their-tax-bill-
will-simplify-the-code/547127/; Jon Aldrich, Here is Your New Simplified Tax Law, Blog: Focus
Financial Advisors (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.focusfinancialadvisors.com/category/blog/taxes/,
[https://perma.cc/D362-NBQJ] ("Despite the promise of tax 'reform' or 'simplification', the bill actually
adds hundreds of pages to our tax laws.").
231. Crews, Commandments (2016), supra note 15, at 60 ("Agencies do not answer to voters...
For too long, Congress has shirked its constitutional duty to make the tough calls. Instead, it delegates
substantial lawmaking power to agencies and then fails to ensure that the regulations deliver benefits that
exceed costs.").
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2. Homeland Security Compliance Costs
The Crain and Crews studies tally $22 billion and $57 billion, respectively,
for homeland security costs, broken down as follows:
Table 4
Comparison of Crain and Crews Cost Estimates
for Homeland Security Compliance
Crews232 Crain233
Category (billions of (billions of
2013 dollars) 2014 dollars)
OMB-Reported Cost of Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Regulations $16 $15
Issued Through 2014 (Crain)/2016 (Crews)
Value of Passenger Time Spent in
Transportation Security Administration $10 $ 7
(TSA) Screening
Crews "Mods and Supplements" $31 N/A
Total $57 $22
The first row of this table accurately reflects the sum of estimated costs for
DHS regulations issued through 2014 (Crains) and 2016 (Crews). It thus reflects
DHS's O1RA-approved ex ante assessment of the likely costs of DHS rules
issued through the indicated year, subject to the caveats and uncertainties
discussed earlier in connection with OMB reports of anticipated costs and
benefits of other social regulations. 234
The second row of this table tallies $7-10 billion per year cost
corresponding to lost time in airport screening lines. This time translates into a
cost to GDP only if one assumes, improbably, that every minute spent waiting in
line to clear security is subtracted minute for minute from the total sum of
minutes spent generating income that becomes part of GDP. Such an assumption
is both undemonstrated and counterintuitive. TSA estimates that passenger
security screening adds ten minutes of wait time to air travel on average, and
reports that less than 1 percent of passengers in 2017 encountered waits longer
than thirty minutes in the course of their travel.23 5 This small (if annoying)
amount of time added to the security process would not be expected to reduce
"productivity" for the leisure traveler, and it may not reduce the productivity of
232. Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 72-77; Principia Bureaucratica, supra note 34, at
rows 48 51; "Placeholder for Annual Cost of Homeland Security Regulation," spreadsheet available
online at https://bit.ly/luHpYic [https://perma.cc/PYG4-BRYX] [hereinafter Crews DHS Placeholder
Table].
233. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 37-38.
234. See supra discussion in Part III.B.3.
235. Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 75 (quoting TSA estimate). See also U.S. GOVT'
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, AVIATION SECURITY: TSA USES
CURRENT ASSUMPTIONS AND AIRPORT-SPECIFIC DATA FOR ITS STAFFING PROCESS AND MONITORS
PASSENGER WAIT TIMES USING DAILY OPERATIONS DATA, GAO Rep. No. 18-236, at 1 (Feb. 2018).
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the business traveler either, if he or she makes up that lost time either in the
airport or back at the office. Monetization of such small increments of time might
be appropriate in a welfare calculation, but it clearly does not belong in a
calculation of cost to GDP.
The remaining categories of DHS-related regulatory cost-totaling $31
billion-are tallied only by Crews, not by the Crains. None of these categories
reflects persuasive estimates but they do reveal, once again, Crews's propensity
for number-snatching. As seen below, Crews draws his $31 billion in "mods and
supplements" (other than those reflecting airport waiting time) largely from a
2011 study by Professors John Mueller and Mark Stewart.23 6 These authors' bias
against regulation is evident in their assertion that the current level of enhanced
expenditures to deter a terrorist attack like that of September 11, 2001, "would
be cost-effective only if that sort of attack would have occurred more than once
a year without them"237-an attitude toward risk from terror that surely puts
them well out of the mainstream of public opinion in the United States.
Yet Crews's tally of homeland security regulatory costs occasionally goes
beyond the claims even of Mueller and Stewart. For example, Crews chalks up
$10 billion in "private sector spending" for security not required by DHS
regulation and $4 billion in terrorism risk insurance premiums, though Mueller
and Steward do not assert that either of these sums are spent in response to
regulatory requirements. 2 38
Crews also derives $20 billion in "[d]eadweight and consumer welfare
losses" from Mueller and Stewart. 239 He derives this number by subtracting $10
billion from a $30 billion figure that appears in Table 1 of Mueller and Stewart,
though the latter offer no explanation or source citation for that figure either in
the table or elsewhere in the article.240 The trail thus ends with Mueller and
236. See Crews DHS Placeholder Table, supra note 232 (citing a $41 billion increment over and
above OMB figures, of which $10 billion is accounted for by passenger delays (screening etc.) discussed
separately above, leaving alleged DHS costs of $31 billion per year still to be explained). The Placeholder
Table reveals that $29 billion of that $31 billion comes from John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Terror,
Security and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits and Costs of Homeland Security, Paper prepared for
presentation at the panel, "Terror and the Economy: Which Institutions Help Mitigate the Damage?",
Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL (Apr.
1,2011) at 17. https://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MD IITSM.PDF [https://perma.cc/L2GR
-CBAW] [hereinafter Mueller & Stewart], and was cited in Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 76,
and Crews DHS Placeholder Table, supra note 232. The remaining $2 billion are derived by averaging
the Mueller and Stewart estimate with the estimate by Ellig of traffic fatalities to be expected from people
driving rather than flying due to delays and higher prices arising from DHS security.
237. Mueller & Stewart, supra note 236, at 17.
238. Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 76; Crews DHS Placeholder Table, supra note 232
(noting that Crews has excluded $5 billion of Mueller and Stewart's $10 billion estimate for private sector
security costs to reflect expenditures that are required by DHS rules and therefore already captured in the
first row of the table). This raises the question of why Crews includes in a "cost-of-regulation" estimate
$5 billion of costs that are not thought to be required by any federal regulation.
239. Crews DHS Placeholder Table, supra note 232, at row 12.
240. The only other reference to such losses is at Mueller & Stewart, supra note 236, at 15, where
he lists the categories of cost appearing in Table 1, including "hidden and indirect costs or 'dead weight
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Stewart, leaving nothing but ipse dixit as evidence for $20 billion of alleged
regulatory costs.
Finally, Crews charges another $2 billion in regulatory costs to the value of
lives lost by people driving to their destination (and crashing along the way)
rather than enduring the annoyance of waiting in line to clear TSA security. This
number was derived-via intermediary studies by Mueller and Stewart and Jerry
Ellig at the Mercatus Center-ultimately from a single study authored by Garick
Blalock and others in 2007.241 The original study by Blalock drew on theoretical
price elasticities of demand for air travel and estimated fatality rates in auto travel
to assess the association of traffic fatalities and enplanement rates over the period
1999-2003, i.e., just before and after September 11, 2001.242 Blalock estimated
that new security charges and delays resulted in 8.64 million fewer enplanements
in the fourth quarter of 2002, yielding a total of 129 additional auto fatalities in
that-quarter, which becomes 520 additional deaths per year.2 43 The Blalock study
also recognized, however, that the decline in flying during this chaotic period of
heightened fear and delay after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was
atypical and probably overstated the long-term impact.2 44 More fundamentally,
all such estimates implicitly assume, as Crews does explicitly, that airport
security is either unnecessary or futile.2 45 Altering Crews's futility assumption-
to allow for the possibility that security screening may actually deter or prevent
new terrorist hijackings and bombings in the air-would require a very different
approach to estimating security "costs." This more realistic approach would
incorporate a countervailing estimate of how many people would be expected to
drive rather than fly-and how many would die in car crashes as a result-if
there were one (or several) more airline bombing(s) that careful screening might
have prevented. By focusing myopically on only one set of costs-the-cost of
losses' of implementing security-related regulations that amounted to at least $30 billion in lost output per
year."
241. Mueller & Stewart, supra note 236, at 7; Jerry Ellig et al., A Framework for Evaluating
Counterterrorism Regulations, MERCATUS POLICY SERIES, POLICY RESOURCE No. 3, at 35 (Mercatus
Center 2006) (also citing Blalock study), available online at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files
/publication/20060908 PS terrorismComplete.pdf. [https://perma.cc/M7CU-Q3GT]. Both studies cite
Garrick Blalock et al., The Impact of Post-9/l1 Airport Security Measures on the Demand for Air
Travel, 50 J. L. & ECON. 731, 752 (2007) [hereinafter Blalock (2007)].
242. See Blalock (2007), supra note 241, at 737.
243. See Blalock (2007), supra note 241, at 752. Neither Blalock nor Ellig assign monetary values
to these lives lost in traffic accidents. Mueller and Stewart assign them a value of $6.5 million per life
which they say reflects the "DHS-mandated value of statistical life." See Mueller & Stewart, supra note
236, at 4 tbl. 1,202 n. 19.
244. Blalock (2007), supra note 241, at 753 ("... the short time span prevents us from measuring
the persistence of the demand decline. We would expect the demand to slowly return to pre-
intervention levels as the TSA and airports invest in infrastructure to minimize the inconvenience
of baggage screening.").
245. See Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30, at 72 ("The only useful airport security measures
since 9/11 were locking and reinforcing the cockpit doors so terrorists can't break in, positive baggage
matching and teaching the passengers to fight back. The rest is security theater... future attacks will
involve targets other than airlines.").
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regulation-while airbrushing out of the picture the costs of non-regulation,
Crews and his sources do not offer an apples-to-apples cost comparison of
alternative real-world scenarios. They simply conjure (and smuggle into their
analysis) a counterfactual world in which the cost of security screening is
recognized as a cost, but the cost of terrorism is not.
IV. ON THE INVALIDITY OF EXISTING AGGREGATE COST OF REGULATION
ESTIMATES AND THE NEED TO STOP COMPILING THEM
Part III demonstrated that the "aggregate cost of regulation" is unknown and
most likely unknowable based on currently available data and studies. Crews
ironically acknowledges this fundamental fact in the subtitle to his annual
magnum opus, Tip of the Costberg: On the Invalidity ofAll Cost of Regulation
Estimates and the Need to Compile Them Anyway. 24 6 His candor is refreshing,
but his argument is illogical. One does not, or should not, publish estimates one
knows to be invalid. The rational response to an invalid aggregate cost estimate
is to not publish it.
In fact, OMB came to this conclusion over a decade ago when it formally
abandoned the effort to develop an aggregate statistic for "the" cost of federal
regulation.247 OIRA supplied two persuasive reasons for taking this important
step. First, as OIRA explained in its final 2002 Report to Congress, formal OMB
tabulations of anticipated costs and benefits of agency regulations did not begin
until 1995.248 Cost estimates for regulations compiled prior to that year derived
largely from privately funded studies that did not meet basic federal data quality
standards,24 9 an observation clearly corroborated by our in-depth examination of
several of those studies in this Article. 2 50 OIRA thus decided to limit itself to
rigorous, agency-generated estimates going forward.
Second, OIRA concluded as well that "[w]e do not believe that the [ex ante]
estimates of the costs and benefits of regulations issued over ten years ago are
reliable or very useful for informing current policy decisions." 25 1 Thus, since
2002, OIRA has consistently limited itself to ten-year compilations of regulatory
costs and benefits.
246. Crews, Costberg (2017), supra note 30.
247. OMB Report to Congress (2002), supra note 133.
248. Id. at 36-37.
249. Id. at 37, 40 (noting that "[s]everal commenters expressed the opinion that the aggregate
estimates in the draft report would not meet OMB's data quality guidelines for reproducibility and
transparency" and quoting with approval a peer reviewer's observation that "the technical analysis and
quantitative aggregations in the draft [OMB] report [which quoted such studies] are generally of poor
quality and in my view do not meet the standards for publication in the peer reviewed joumals with which
I am familiar").
250. See supra Parts III.B.I and III.B.2.
251. OMB Report to Congress (2002), supra note 133, at 37 (disavowing the aggregate cost estimate




OIRA's ten-year look-back policy may limit the upper range of possible
error, but it does not entirely resolve the empirical, data-quality problem. First,
OJRA's ten-year rule ignores older rules which may or may not be cost effective
and rational, but which cannot simply be ignored if they are still in effect,
imposing costs and yielding benefits. Second, as we have seen, OIRA's ten-year
look-back limitation does not change the fact that the estimates compiled in
OMB's annual reports remain, intrinsically, guesses about the likely future cost
of complying with rules that may be (a) overturned by courts, (b) modified by
agencies, (c) subject to waivers, variances and (d) enforced to different degrees
and in different ways by federal agencies and/or state regulators wielding
delegated authority. In addition, as we have seen, complying with such rules may
yield unexpected costs and challenges for regulated entities, or they may
stimulate previously-unanticipated innovations and efficiencies that cause actual
costs to be less than expected.252 Reporting an ex ante prediction as "the" cost
of a regulation is thus like reporting pregame bets about the likely score of a
Super Bowl game as the actual score of the game.2 5 3 Adding estimates of the
cost of regulations enacted in a given year and then repeating the process for
successive years merely compounds the errors. OIRA's policy of halting the
accumulation of error after ten years may cap the upper boundary of discrepancy
between hypothesis and fact, but it does little to assure us that this assemblage of
aging guesses offers a sufficiently reliable measure of actual costs or benefits as
to provide a sound basis for policy decisions.
To this ex ante problem, there is no clear solution other than systematic
retrospective evaluation of the actual costs and benefits of selected rules on the
books. Simply as a matter of logic, an aggregate regulatory cost estimate standing
alone (even if it were reliable) could not establish that any given aggregate cost
is too high without reference to the benefits of those regulations. 2 54 Moreover,
even if one were somehow able to prove that a given aggregate cost is both
reliably established and "too high," that conclusion by itself would offer no clue
as to which particular regulations should be cut or modified. Responding
meaningfully to a problem of excessive cost likewise would require retrospective
review of individual regulations, with a focus on costs and benefits.2 55
252. See discussion supra Part III.B and sources cited therein.
253. For a detailed discussion of the fallacy of conflating ex ante predictions with actual costs and
benefits, see Richard Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1345, 1367-70 (2003).
254. Heinzerling & Ackerman (2012), supra note 17, at 146-47; Shapiro (2011), supra note 17, at
1-2.
255. A full treatment of the role of retrospective benefit-cost review as an alternative to regulatory
budgets is beyond our present scope. Suffice it to say here that retrospective review of regulatory costs
and benefits for individual regulations has a long history and strong bipartisan support. See Exec. Order
No. 13,610 (May 10, 2012), Exec. Order No. 13,563 (Jan. 18, 2011) (calling for retrospective review
during the Obama Administration); Exec. Order No. 12044 (1978) (calling for agencies to undertake
periodic review of existing regulations in the Carter Administration); Exec. Order No. 12,291 (calling for
retrospective review under the Reagan Administration); Exec. OrderNo. 12,866 (Sept. 30, 1993) (Clinton
Administration). OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON
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It may be tempting to assume that implementing a regulatory budget (as the
Trump Administration has done with Executive Order 13,771) requires
knowledge of the absolute level of aggregate regulatory costs. But this is not the
case. As OIRA noted in 2002, presciently anticipating the possibility of
regulatory budgets at a future date:
Some observers see a complete 'accounting statement'-one that includes
all existing rules on the books-as a necessary condition for enactment of a
'regulatory budget.' The idea is that Congress might be expected to authorize
each year a total regulatory budget, much like Congress now passes an
appropriation for an agency's 'on-budget' expenses. Although the idea of a
regulatory budget is worthy of consideration, we do not believe that a
complete accounting statement is necessary to move forward with the idea.
A regulatory budget need only be incremental to the current baseline. One
does not need to know full costs and benefits of all regulations to decide that
regulatory costs should be held to an increase (or decrease) of a specified
amount over the next year. In fact, most Federal budgeting is incremental in
nature. 256
As it happens, the Trump regulatory budget is incremental in precisely this
way, just as OMB predicted in 2002: it caps incremental additions to agency
regulatory cost in any given fiscal year, without attempting to calculate aggregate
regulatory cost of all regulations in effect.2 57 There is thus no need and no role
for the Crain and Crews aggregate cost estimates in implementing the Trump
Administration's regulatory budget.
In short, aggregate regulatory cost estimates of the kind produced by Crews
and the Crains are at once unreliable, unnecessary, and irrelevant to regulatory
policy. They circulate freely in the media and on Capitol Hill, where they are a
frequent incitement to denunciations of regulations and regulators. But they play
no constructive role in regulatory policy and they shed no useful light on the
actual costs and benefits of federal regulations, individually or in aggregate, past
or present.
STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL ENTITLES. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (George W. Bush
Administration). See also Administrative Conference of the United States, Retrospective Review of
Agency Rules, adopted Dec. 4, 2014. For excellent survey of retrospective review policy over the years
and lessons learned from it, see Joseph E. Aldy, Learning from Experience: An Assessment of the
Retrospective Reviews of Agency Rules and the Evidence for Improving the Design and Implementation
of Regulatory Policy (Nov. 17, 2014) (NBER Working Paper). See also Cary Coglianese, Moving
Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE. J. ON REGULATION 57 (2013); U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REEXAMINING REGULATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE
EFFECTIVENESS AND TRANSPARENCY OF RETROSPECTIVE REVtEwS (GAO-07-791, July 2007).
Progressive scholars also have noted, however, evidence of a bipartisan bias towards deregulation in the
approach of successive administrations to retrospective review. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore,
Unbalanced Retrospective Review, Penn Program on Regulation at U. Pa. L.: The Regulatory Review
(July 12, 2012), https://www.theregreview.org/2012/07/12/12-livermore-schwartz-review/ (noting the
deregulatory bias of the Obama-era executive orders cited above in this note).
256. OMB Report to Congress (2002), supra note 133, at 41.
257. Exec. Order No. 13,771, supra note 5.
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The question, then, is why these analytically invalid and policy-irrelevant
estimates continue to be circulated and quoted. Answering that question requires
a broader effort to connect the dots and see the larger political picture of which
these antiregulatory studies form an integral part.
V. EXPLAINING THE IMPACT OF BOGUS STUDIES: A LIBERTARIAN
ARCHIPELAGO
The attentive reader of the preceding pages may have noticed a pattern.
Consistently high estimates of regulatory cost (around $2 trillion per year in 2014
dollars) issue from two sets of authors (Crain and Crain, and Crews) year after
year.2 58 The two sets of studies reach their similar estimates with very different
methodologies, different scope of coverage, and very different subtotals for
individual categories of cost.25 9 The papers are self-published by their
sponsoring organizations, all of which have a notably pro-business and anti-
regulatory orientation.2 60
258. CEI published the 2018 update of Ten Thousand Commandments, with its $1.9 trillion cost
estimate, as the "25th Anniversary" edition. See Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr. TEN THOUSAND
COMMANDMENTS, 25TH ANNIVERSARY, AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE REGULATORY STATE at 3,
available online at https://cei.org/sites/default/files/TenThousandCommandments_2018.pdf. W. Mark
Crain has published at least four similar studies of the aggregate cost of regulation over a seventeen year
period. See W. Mark Crain & Thomas D. Hopkins, The impact of regulatory costs on smallfirms, U.S.
Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy (2001) (unpublished paper); W. Mark Crain, The
impact of regulatory costs on smallfirms, U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy
(2005); Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, The impact of regulatory costs on smallfirms, U.S. Small
Business Administration, Office of Advocacy (2010); The Cost of Federal Regulation to the U.S.
Economy, Manufacturing and Small Business: A Report for the National Association of Manufacturers
(2014). As seen supra at note 18 and accompanying text, the SBA Office of Advocacy in 2017 retained
the Crams to undertake a fifth study of the aggregate cost of regulation, though that contract was later
discontinued under congressional pressure. See supra note 18.
259. See supra Table I and accompanying text, showing that the component estimates that Crews
and the Crams add together to form their total estimates for the cost of economic, social, homeland
security, and tax regulatory cost categories are quite different in the two studies. The Crams omit all social
regulations other than environmental and OSHA rules and their estimate presumably would have been
higher had they included all categories of regulation as Crews did. See supra note 139 and accompanying
text. As we have seen, Crews notes that his numbers are subject to change "at the author's discretion," see
supra note 34 and accompanying text, and Costberg is itself riddled with judgment calls about how much
of which category of costs from some prior estimate to include in the aggregate cost calculation-with
billions of dollars of regulatory cost often riding on each call. For instance, in Costberg, Crews arbitrarily
lifts the price for economic regulations as a portion of estimated efficiency costs; erroneously relies on
cost calculations derived solely from the page count of the Code of Federal Regulations; and disregards
BLS statistics to offer a grossly implausible estimate of tax compliance costs. Crews, Costberg (2017),
supra note 30, at 35-37, 51; see also supra Part III.C.1 (comparing Crews's estimate of tax compliance
costs with the actual payroll and employee counts provided by BLS). Given this latitude in determining
the size of the building blocks (the subtotals) it would seem quite easy for Crews to make the total come
to practically whatever number he pleases, within a very broad range.
260. Crews is employed by the Competitive Enterprise Institute, an institute that proclaims its
allegiance to the "principles of limited government, free enterprise, and individual liberty." See About,
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, https://cei.org/about-cei. [https://perma.cc/KY6N-C79G]. See also
the profile at CEI, supra note 31. The orientation of the National Association of Manufacturers is obvious
from its name. Numerous scholars and advocates have noted the consistently antiregulatory orientation of
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The Crain and Crews studies employ divergent definitions and methods for
estimating the cost of "economic" regulations, and examine rather different
ranges of social regulations: Crews adopts a comprehensive approach while the
Crains limit their coverage to environmental and occupational safety and health
regulations. But for the categories of regulations they both examine
(environmental, occupational, tax, and homeland security regulations), the two
sets of studies draw on similar authors, either directly or indirectly.2 6 1 These
source authors typically resided (professionally) in either small universities or
policy centers with a distinct pro-business and/or libertarian orientation,
principally the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. 26 2 Few, if any, of
SBA Office of Advocacy. See Gary D. Bass et al., The Need to Strengthen Regulatory Enforcement, 20
GEO. PUBL. POLICY REV 33 (2015); Heinzerling (2012), supra note 17, at 158; Sidney Shapiro & James
Goodwin, Distorting The Interests Of Small Business: How The Small Business Administration Office Of
Advocacy's Politicization Of Small Business Concerns Undermines Public Health And Safety (Center For
Progressive Reform White Paper #1302, Jan. 2013).
261. "Indirect" references are defined here as references to OMB reports that derive their regulatory
cost estimates from un-vetted, non-govemmental authors. As seen in Parts III.B. I and 2, OMB abandoned
the practice of relying on such authors for regulatory cost estimates beginning in 2002, because such
studies were deemed too unreliable to meet basic data quality standards. Yet Crews continues to refer to
numbers drawn from the studies as "OMB numbers" even though OMB has not cited such numbers or
included them in any official tally in over fifteen years.
262. Crews brackets his $2 trillion aggregate cost estimate with a $4 trillion figure published by the
Mercatus Center. See Bentley Coffey et al., The Cumulative Cost of Regulations (Apr. 2016) (Mercatus
Center Working Paper), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Coffey-Cumulative-Cost-Regs-v3.pdf. The
Crews and Crain studies both draw their workplace regulation cost estimates from Joseph M. Johnson.
See Joseph M Johnson, "A Review and Synthesis of the Cost of Workplace Regulations," Mercatus
Center, Geo. Mason Univ. (Aug. 30, 2001), http://mercatus.org/sites/default
/files/publication/MC RSP RA- SynthesisofWorkplaceCost 010830.pdf. A review of Costberg's
footnotes reveals that Crews draws frequently on conservative-leaning centers for cost numbers for other
sub-categories of regulation. See e.g., JASON J. FICHTNER & JACOB M. FELDMAN, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF
TAX COMPLIANCE (2013), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Fichtner Tax Compliance v3.pdf
(published by the Mercatus Center); Jerry Ellig, Costs and Consequences of Federal Telecommunications
Regulations, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 37 (2007), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=982574## (Jerry Ellig is a Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center); RICHARD
WILLIAMS, THE IMPACT OF REGULATION ON INVESTMENT AND THE U.S. ECONOMY
(2011), http://www.mercatus.org/sites/default/iles/publication/House /o200versight%/ 20Response /%20o
n%20Regulations%20and%2OEconomy[2].pdf (published by the Mercatus Center); CHRIS
EDWARDS, AGRICULTURAL REGULATIONS AND TRADE BARRIERS (2009), http://www.downsizing
government.org/agriculture/regulations-and-trade-barriers (published on DownsizingGovemment.org, a
project of the Cato Institute); LOWELL GALLAWAY & JONATHAN ROBE, THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (2014), http://www.cei.org/sites/default/files/Lowell / 20Gallaway
%20and%20Jonathan%2ORobe%20-%20Unintended% 2OConsequences%20ofo20Collective
%20Bargaining.pdf (published by the Competitive Enterprise Institute); James L. Gattuso & Diane
Katz, Red Tape Rising 2016: Obama Regs Top $100 Billion Annually, 3127 THE HERITAGE FOUND.
BACKGROUNDER 1 (2016), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/20l6/05/red-tape-rising-2016-
obama-regs-top- 100-billion-annually; Diane Katz, Here Comes the Durbin Tax, THE DAILY NEWS, (Sept.
30,2011), http://www.blog.heritage.org/2011/09/30/here-comes-the-durbin-tax/ (Diane Katz is a research
fellow in regulatory policy at The Heritage Foundation); INST. FOR 21ST CENTURY ENERGY AND U.S.
CHAMBER OF COM., ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF POTENTIAL NEW CARBON REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2014), http://www.energyxxi.org/sites/default/files/file-tool/AssessingtheImpact of
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these building-block studies withstand close methodological scrutiny, as we have
seen, but they do exhibit two traits in common with each other and with the
aggregate studies by Crews and the Crains that they inform: they yield
implausibly high estimates of regulatory cost,2 63 and they ignore or downplay
the benefits of regulation.
The last trait is particularly noteworthy. We have seen that the Crains simply
dismiss the benefits of regulation as outside the scope of their study,264 while
Crews mentions benefits only to declare them overstated and overrated. 265 Yet
the benefits of regulation include ensuring the safety of the air we breathe, the
water we drink, and the food we eat; the safety of the medicines we take for
illness and the toys with which our children play; the safety of the places where
we work; the cars in which we ride, and the planes and trains in which we travel
far afield. Regulations protect Americans from terror in the air, on the ground,
and in cyberspace. Regulations seek to provide fair and orderly access to all
manner of government benefits ranging from crop insurance to Medicare,
Medicaid, and Social Security. Regulations are charged with protecting the
security of our banks and our savings and investments, and guarding against
fraudulent and oppressive practices in the financial marketplace. In fact, as
Professor Steven Vogel has pointed out, financial markets could not function
without regulation.2 66
Regulations are necessary, as any student of microeconomics or
administrative law understands, because experience has shown that market
failures (monopolies, externalities, and asymmetries of information) will impose
large costs on society-through injury, illness, pollution, resource depletion,
fraud, price gouging, labor exploitation, etc.- if the behavior of profit-seeking
individuals and firms is left totally uncontrolled.26 7 The "benefits" of rules are
thus not luxuries of bureaucrats, but necessities of civilized life. Even the Trump
Administration's OTRA does not dispute that the benefits of the rules it has
compiled outweigh their costs by a large margin, in aggregate.2 68 Yet the benefits
of regulations simply disappear from view in the studies by Crews and the Crains
Potential New CarbonRegulations in the United States.pdf". See also Joseph M. Johnson, The Cost
of Regulations Implementing the Clean Water Act (Mar. 2004) (Mercatus Center Working Paper),
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/cost-regulations-implementing-clean-water-act.pdf.
263. See discussion supra Parts III.A.2 and III.B.
264. Crain (2014) supra note 14, at 6 ("... we stress that the study is unconcerned about a benefit-
cost calculus for any specific regulation or regulations as a whole.").
265. Crews, Costberg (2017) supra note 30, at 15-18.
266. Steven K Vogel, MARKETCRAFT: How GOVERNMENTS MAKE MARKETS WORK I (Oxford
University Press 2018).
267. N. Gregory Mankiw, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS (7th ed.) (Cengage Learning 2015) at
195-212 (discussing externalities as market failures), 299-327 (monopolies), 462-64 (asymmetric
information).
268. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 2017 DRAFT
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 10, tbl. 1 -1 (2017).
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and in many of the studies they cite, in favor of a tunnel-visioned focus on often-
unsupported claims of cost.
How does one explain the proliferation of frequently-cited and influential
studies dedicated to generating improbably high estimates of costs for cost of
regulations while disregarding or discounting their benefits? One possible
explanation may be found in the research of Professor Nancy MacLean, the
William H. Chafe Professor of History and Public Policy at Duke University.
She recently documented the rise of a veritable archipelago of such think tanks
and advocacy centers for the libertarian creed: Cato Institute, Heritage
Foundation, Citizens for a Sound Economy, Americans for Prosperity, Club for
Growth, Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Mercatus Center, the Tax
Foundation, and the Charles Koch Foundation.2 6 9 Many of these centers, she
demonstrates, are funded by the Koch brothers and/or other like-minded donors
who hold strongly libertarian views. 270
Of these, the most prolific and important to the academic credibility of the
message is the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.2 71 As we have
seen, the Mercatus Center issued several of the most important studies cited in
the Crain and Crews studies and discussed in this Article: the Johnson study
inflating OSHA costs, and the Mueller & Stewart and Ellig studies of
telecommunications regulatory costs and homeland security costs. 272 Indeed, the
Mercatus Center has issued its own estimate of "the" cost of federal regulation-
$4 trillion per year-a figure they derive from the same mathematically-
tautological approach to economy-wide modeling that Hahn discounted and that
Heinzerling and Ackerman debunked in connection with Hazilla and Kopp's
estimate of aggregate environmental regulatory costs in 1990.273
While a full airing of the pros and cons of the libertarian worldview is far
beyond our scope, the defining feature of the libertarian philosophy in its extreme
form is, in Professor MacLean's description, that "the only legitimate role of
269. NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE RADICAL RIGHT'S
STEALTH PLAN FOR AMERICA xix (Viking 2017) [hereinafter MacLean (2017)].
270. Id.
271. Id. at223.
272. See Johnson (2005) supra note 144. See also discussion supra Part II.B.2.
273. See Bentley Coffey et al., The Cumulative Cost of Regulations (2016) (Mercatus Working
Paper), available online at https://www.mercatus.org/publication/cumulative-cost-regulations
[https://perma.cc/ZZT5-YQET]. The Mercatus Center itself is directed by Tyler Cowen, Distinguished
Senior Fellow, F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at
George Mason University. Cowen is quite public about his views of the good society: one in which
"worthy individuals" climb their way out of poverty making it "easier to ignore those who are left behind."
According to MacLean, his vision of the good society is a nation in which Medicaid is cut back, welfare
is cut back, and masses of people migrate from high-cost regions like the northeast and west to low-cost
states like Texas, which offers "very cheap housing" to offset its "subpar public services." MacLean
(2017), supra note 269, at 213. TYLER COWEN, AVERAGE IS OVER: POWERING AMERICA BEYOND THE
AGE OF THE GREAT STAGNATION 241-45, 247, 258 (NEW YORK: DUTTON 2013), quoted in MacLean
(2017), supra note 269, at 212-13. It is tempting to regard these as simply personal opinions. They are
that, but they are also the logical and foreseeable consequences of implementing the libertarian approach
to government. Cowen is simply spelling them out.
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government is to ensure the rule of law, guarantee social order, and provide for
the national defense." 2 74 If Marx extolled equality at the near-total expense of
liberty, libertarianism preaches the maximization of liberty at the near-total
expense of even a semblance of redistribution or equality or government
regulation.2 75 What neither of these ideologies can countenance, in their extreme
forms, is the possibility of a moderate or middle path of the "mixed economy" in
which free markets thrive within a framework of government regulation aimed
at keeping them honest, preventing abuse of monopoly power, and controlling
for externalities, i.e., curing market failures, while providing a humane economic
floor to limit the suffering of the very poor or severely disadvantaged.
This "mixed economy" model has been the prevailing paradigm in America
since the Great Depression (though increasingly under siege since about
1980).276 It remains the governing philosophy of a number of European countries
that regularly rank higher than the United States on the WEF business executive
approval ratings. 2 77 It has the advantage of being the only approach to
government that offers even the possibility of curing market failures where they
arise. But the mixed economy model of regulation suffers from one major flaw
for libertarians and regulatory critics: it entails a prominent role for government,
which is assumed by libertarians to act only selfishly to (a) aggrandize its own
power2 78 and (b) grant favors to rent-seeking actors who support those who
control the government. 279
274. MacLean (2017), supra note 269, at 213.
275. KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME 10 (C.P. Dutt ed., International Publishers
1966) (1891); see F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 85 (1960) ("Equality of the general rules
of law and conduct, however, is the only kind of equality conducive to liberty and the only equality which
we can secure without destroying liberty. Not only has liberty nothing to do with any other sort of equality,
but it is even bound to produce inequality in many respects. This is the necessary result and part of the
justification of individual liberty: if the result of individual liberty did not demonstrate that some manners
of living are more successful than others, much of the case for it would vanish.").
276. Vogel, supra note 266, at 44-47 (Oxford University Press 2018) (documenting the central role
of government regulation in enabling markets to function).
277. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
278. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 227-30
(197 l)(asserting that bureaucratic behavior can best be understood not by the pursuit of the public interest,
but by the desire to maximize the budget and power of the bureaucrat).
279. JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1-9 (1962). According to MacLean, this book was cited
by the Nobel Prize Committee as foundational to the emergence of public choice theory which "revealed
the fallacy of assuming that market failure could be remedied through the political process, for there, too,
people 'behave selfishly."' MacLean (2017) supra note 269, at 186. Buchanan was awarded the Nobel
Prize for economics in 1986. But so strong were his libertarian leanings that he argued that "where the
relevant set of choices are those relating to changes in the law, in the rules that constrain both private and
public activity, there is no place for majority rule or, indeed, for any rule short of unanimity." Michael
Chwe, The beliefs of economist James Buchanan conflict with basic democratic norms. Here's why,
WASH. POST. (July 25, 2017), https://www.wasbingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/25/the-
beliefs-of-economist-james-buchanan-conflict-with-basic-democratic-norms-heres-
why/?utmterm=.6e952e2666d7. Such a rule would, of course, make legislation (hence regulation)
virtually impossible.
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Studies of regulation by libertarian-leaning advocates would be expected to
focus on cost because the authors want to draw public and policy makers'
attention to the burdens of regulations for regulated interests, and not their
benefits. They would be expected to focus on aggregate costs because doing so
yields the largest, most dramatic, and hence most quotable number. They would
construct their aggregate with the studies of individual component costs that
yield the highest numbers. And they would not worry much about the validity of
either their study or the studies that form their database because who, after all,
has time to check such things in any case?
There is no suggestion here of some sort of conspiracy; none is needed. Nor
need we assume conscious intention to mislead. Common ideology and
economic interest could generate such a skew and confirmation bias
independently, without conscious collusion. When iron filings align in a certain
pattern on a plane, the most likely explanation is neither random chance nor some
insidious agreement among the filings: it is a magnetic field that arranges them.
In this case, it appears that the libertarian ideology of major funders aligns with
the commercial self-interest of more pragmatic business groups such as the
National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce to form
a powerful force field opposed to regulation. This antiregulatory predilection
shapes and aligns the studies put out by the centers in the "libertarian
archipelago"-centers that employ overt advocates like Crews-as well as the
business-oriented centers like NAM and SBA Advocacy that award lucrative
research contracts to academics like the Crains.
As Upton Sinclair once famously observed, "It is difficult to get a man to
understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it." 280
This would explain the selective choice of evidence deemed reliable (or
unreliable) by authors who hold a certain point of view. It would explain the
proliferation of centers publishing convergent messages yielding an abundance
of confirming footnotes that give the "published" product verisimilitude and
authority. And it would explain the efficacy of that message: the
libertarian/business archipelago itself exploits the "availability heuristic"
discussed earlier in this Article to substitute repetition for proof in propelling an
antiregulatory message.2 8 1 That message gets a willing audience (and
megaphone) from Capitol Hill, where libertarians led by Dick Armey and Newt
Gingrich led a movement that produced the Contract with America and a
conservative majority in 1994, and produced an enduring (now controlling) bloc
of reliable votes for a strongly libertarian agenda on regulation that persists to
the present day.2 8 2
280. Upton Sinclair, L Candidate for Governor and How I Got Licked, OAKLAND TRIBUNE 109
(Dec. 11, 1934).
281. See supra discussion accompanying notes 101-02.
282. MacLean (2017), supra note 269, at 190-92. Defining the appeal of the "libertarian" ideology
electorally and in Congress requires a measure of nuance. Conservative observers note that the appeal of
pure and comprehensive libertarianism is not overwhelming and may be in decline in the areas of trade
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MacLean offers abundant historical evidence for the "force field"
hypothesis: far more evidence than can be compressed into these pages.283 That
said, it remains one scholar's account. It should not be taken at face value, but
studied, probed, and tested like any other scholarly contribution. Regulatory
critics may contest the facts of her account. Even if it withstands factual scrutiny,
they may reply that the libertarian project merely serves to counterbalance the
liberal force field of the traditional academic establishment, with its visceral
devotion to expanding government in the service of social engineering. Such an
exchange might simply confirm that regulatory policy and rhetoric has become
nearly as polarized, and polarizing, an issue in today's United States as abortion,
guns, and climate change.
In any case, the situation poses a dilemma for Congress, for the President,
for agencies, for the media, for. scholars, and for the public. When "experts"
disagree, whom do you believe? Congress has seen fit to pass the Information
Quality Act to help ensure that agencies act only on the best available data and
analysis.2 84 Congress itself, however, has no equivalent filter or check. This is
alarming because Congress is, after all, one of the most important and powerful
consumers of data and analysis in the world. If an administrative agency gets its
facts or analysis seriously wrong in the course of promulgating aregulation, that
agency is subject to reversal in the courts under the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of judicial review. 28 5 If Congress, however, legislates arbitrarily and
capriciously, based on bogus data or analysis, there usually is no recourse in the
courts at all so long as the law otherwise conforms to the Constitution.2 86 It is
thus especially vital for Congress to get its facts right. Yet Congress appears to
have created for itself no mandatory mechanism or reliable process for vetting
and immigration. See Henry Olson, What Happened to the 'Libertarian Moment"?, NAT'L REVIEW, (Nov.
20, 2017), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/1 1/libertarian-conservatives-influence-republican-
party-shrinking/ (noting that "at most one in six [Republican respondents to exit polls] could be called
liberty-minded conservatives, people who wanted both smaller govemment and lower taxes and made that
their principal priority" while a much larger, and growing, fraction of the Republican base now identify
themselves as "staunch conservatives" but oppose free trade and immigration). Opposition to free trade
and immigration may disqualify such voters from the "libertarian" label for purists at the National Review,
but it does not translate into support for, or even tolerance of, health, safety, environmental, and financial
regulation. In the realm of regulation, the libertarian orientation would appear to remain dominant for the
vast majority of Republican voters, and for their representatives in Congress.
283. MacLean (2017), supra note 269, at xix-xxi, 199-234, and passim.
284. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No, 106-
554 § 515 (appropriations rider colloquially known as "Information Quality Act" requiring OMB to issue
guidance to federal agencies designed to ensure the 'quality, objectivity, utility and integrity' of
information disseminated to the public, and further requiring agencies to issue their own information
quality guidelines to establish administrative mechanisms to allow private parties to see correction of
information disseminated by agencies that does not comply with OMB data quality guidance). For a
description of the Act, see Copeland, Curtis W. and Michael Simpson, The Information Quality Act:
OMB's Guidance and Initial Implementation, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL32532 (Aug. 19,
2004), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32532.pdf.
285. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (2012).
286. James R. Rogers & Georg Vanberg, Resurrecting Lochner: A Defense of Unprincipled Judicial
Activism, 23 J.L ECON. & ORG. 442,446 (2007).
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its sources of information to ensure quality, reliability, or even veracity.287 The
House of Representative's uncritical embrace of a $2 trillion fabrication is the
proverbial canary in a coal mine. There is an urgent need for Congress to take
concrete steps to fix this problem, though the exact nature of the solution is
outside the Article's scope.
CONCLUSION
Parts I through III have shown that there is no credible evidence to support
claims that federal regulation reduces GDP by $2 trillion per year. Nor is there
credible evidence to support claims that the cost of regulations exceeds their
benefits, or that they are harming the economy. Indeed, it is a tribute to the
mesmerizing effect of these studies that willing believers do not seem to notice
the disconnection between these gloom-and-doom claims and the daily news.
The U.S. economy is at or near full employment.2 88 The stock market is hovering
near-record levels (or was until President Trump announced his policy of trade
war).289 Profits for American companies are so high that for years many U.S.
companies have been buying back their own shares en masse.29 0 And the
287. To be sure, House and Senate committees and Members of Congress can request reports on
particular claims, issues, or studies by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and/or the GAO, while
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has an important analytic role on budgetary matters within its
purview. But nothing requires Members of Congress or Committees to seek the counsel of CRS and GAO,
or to discount studies that these entities find to be of dubious reliability. In this case, as seen earlier, the
CRS and GAO both sharply criticized the 2010 Cramin study, but that did not stop the House from later
adopting Concurrent Resolution 125, which uncritically accepted the equally-flawed 2014 aggregate
regulatory cost estimate by these same authors. See supra discussion accompanying note 12.
288. Ben Leubsdorf, Economists Think the U.S. Economy is At or Near Full Employment, WALL
STREET J. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.blogs.wsj.com/economics/2018/01/1 1/economists-think-the-u-s-
economy-is-at-or-near-full-employment/; Lucia Mutikani, U.S. job growth cools as labor market nears
full employment; wages up, REUTERS (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-economy/u-
s-job-growth-cools-as-labor-market-nears-full-employment-wages-up-idUSKBN 1EUOEF
[https://perma.cc/99XM-TJK5].
289. Fred Imbert, Dow spikes 322 points, closes above 26,000for the first time, CNBC (Jan. 17,
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/1 7/us-stocks-dow-eamings-bank-of-america.html [https://
perma.cc/XM7B-SDDK]. As of January 25, 2019, the Dow stood at 24,737.20. See Google: Market
Summary > Dow Jones Industrial Average, Jan. 25, http://perma.cc/95LL-R4X7 (Jan. 27, 2019,9:05 pm).
Given, however, the Trump Administration's heavy-handed deregulation over the past 24 months, that
retrenchment obviously cannot be blamed on new government regulations.
290. Matt Phillips, Trump's Tax Cuts in Hand, Companies Spend More on Themselves Than on
Wages, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/business/tax-cuts-share-
buybacks-corporate.html [https://perma.cc/EA6K-NFRB]. Though the Trump tax bill triggered the latest
round of stock buybacks, high corporate profits and bulging corporate treasure chests of cash were
spawning buybacks in the "heyday" of regulation long before the election of President Trump. See Michael
Kranish, Feast for investors sells workers short, BOSTON GLOBE (May 31, 2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/05/30/companies-pour-billion s-into-buying-back-
stock-but-workers-and-economy-may-paying-high-price/8vi I toy4kZBr59ykKYzdNL/story.html.




economy was doing very well before Trump was elected. 291 Whatever the
precise cost of regulation may be, it clearly is not strangling the U.S. economy.
Therein lies an irony. President Trump needed less than two weeks on the
job to roll out an Executive Order aimed at eliminating "job-killing
regulations"-and an ongoing campaign to repeal or weaken regulations that
protect our health, safety, environment, and economy--despite the awkward fact
that the sole piece of evidence he used tojustify that phrase (an alleged regulatory
cost to the US economy of $2 trillion per year) is without any factual foundation.
Nor is he alone. By the time of President Trump's election, a majority of the
House of Representatives had already jumped enthusiastically aboard the
deregulatory bandwagon: trumpeting the $2 trillion fabrication as a basis for
proposing all manner of antiregulatory restrictions before President Trump was
elected.2 92
What those circumstances reveal is not an economic crisis from over-
regulation. They reveal, rather, the power of the libertarian movement, the
liberties that movement is willing to take with facts, and a deep flaw in the fact-
finding and fact-checking processes of Congress and the White House.
291. See Ezra Klein, The Truth About the Trump Economy: Did Trump Unleash an Economic
Miracle, or Take Credit for Obama's Work?, Vox (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/8/24/17759940/donald-trump-economy-jobs-growth-obama (comparing the economy under
Presidents Obama and Trump and concluding that the economy was doing well before President Trump
took office).
292. See House Conc. Res. 125, supra note 12.
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ANNEX
Results of Efforts to Replicate the Crain and Crain Regression Analysis
and an Exploration of Its Robustness
Matthew B. Hall
Because the Crains refused to share their data, we were forced to compile
our own from the data sources that the Crains mention in their paper, which are
the OECD StatExtracts and World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness
Report.293 A comparison of summary statistics between the Crains dataset and
our dataset follows:
Table 1
Crain & Crain (2014)294
Standard
Variable Mean Dvation Minimum Maximumeviation
GDP per Capita* 10.24 0.39 7.99 11.21
Economic Regulation 4.08 0.70 2.07 5.59
Index**
Trade/GDP** 95.68 54.90 24.69 333.53
Dependency Ratio** 24.42 6.18 10.87 41.54
Tax Revenue/GDP** 34.25 7.28 17.21 49.62
Capital
Investment/GDP** 21.08 5.83 10.76 
52.84
Labor Force*** 8.79 1.48 5.12 11.89
Table 2,
WEF and OECD Data Used in Replication Effort
Variable Mean Standard Minimum MaximumDeviation
GDP per Capita* 10.31 0.37 9.40 11.36
Economic Regulation
Index** 4.08 0.71 2.07 5.68
Trade/GDP** 96.20 57.51 24.49 352.91
Dependency Ratio** 22.53 5.87 8.68 40.37
Tax Revenue/GDP** 33.38 7.23 12.83 46.79
Capital nvestment/GDP** 22.91 4.30 11.60 39.35
Labor Force* ** 8.79 1.47 5.12 11.91
* Indicates a natural logarithmic transformation of the variable.
** One-year lagged value for the variable is used in the regression
293. Klaus Schwab, World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Report, 2013-2014, Full Data
Edition, available online at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF GlobalCompetitivenessReport 2013-
14.pdf[https://perma.cc/XA9E-EC23]. Copies of our datasets are available on request.
294. Crain (2014), supra note 14, at 69.
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It is obvious that these datasets are similar but not identical. For several of
the variables, the various sources make further distinctions between data with
similar descriptions. For instance, GDP per capita can be differentiated by using
current Purchasing Power Parity and prices, or constant Purchasing Power Parity
and prices, the latter of which was used in our analysis. Note that for two
variables (GDP per capita and Labor Force) a natural logarithmic transformation
is used. In all of these estimations, with the exception of (3), we are able to use
221 observations (or data points) whereas the Crains were able to use only 219.
This discrepancy is almost certainly 'due to missing data in the Crains' dataset
that was subsequently updated, but is unlikely to be the cause of all of the
variation.
One important note is that the values of the various components of the
Global Competitiveness Index can be revised or updated. As evidenced by the
above tables of summary statistics, our data for the GCI values are very close but
not identical to the Crains'. However, for all other variables there are larger
discrepancies between the datasets which ultimately could explain our somewhat
different results.
We performed several regressions to test the robustness of the Crain and
Crain analysis.
Table 3 reports the results of our efforts to reproduce the Crain and Crain
regression analysis. In column (1) the results from Crain (2014) are reprinted.
Colunm (2) reports the results of our regression analysis using the equation in
Crain (2014) and the dataset that we compiled. Our results show a more
statistically significant relationship (at a 99 percent level of confidence as
opposed to their 95 percent level of confidence) between the dependent variable
of GDP per capita and the composite index the Crains used, albeit with a much
lower coefficient of 0.052 versus their estimate of 0.081. Thus, the size of our
estimated effect is only 64 percent of theirs.
The regression in Table 3 column (3) uses the same specifications and
country/year combinations as the baseline but using a "fixed effects" model,
which is more useful when analyzing panel (cross-sectional and/or time-series)
data such as this.295 A fixed-effects model controls for unobserved
heterogeneity, which is to say that it can correct for omitted variables, which are
the result of causal inference and selection bias.29 6 In this regression, the sign on
the coefficient for GCI changes, which means that the estimated effect is in the
opposite direction. This would imply that greater regulation in fact leads to lower
GDP per capita. In this regression much of the model retains its statistical
significance.
Column (4) of Table 3 reveals what happens when per capita GDP growth
(the dependent variable of choice in the economic literature on factors shaping
295. A. H. STUDENMUND & BRUCE K. JOHNSON, USING ECONOMETRICS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 475-
83 (7th ed. 2017).
296. Kennedy, supra note 97, at 281-92.
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economic performance) is substituted for ERI in the Crains' regression. It reveals
that the regression coefficient for ERI changes sign and becomes statistically
insignificant by traditional measures.
Table 4, Columns (1) through (6) show what happens when the Crams' ERI
figure is replaced with an alternative GCI component drawn from other "global
competitiveness indicators" covered by the WEF poll (the indicators are listed in
the first row of Table 4). With the exception of column (6)-i1.18 Strength of
Auditing and Reporting Standards-all these factors show statistical
significance. In the last rows of Table 3, we compute the estimated cost to U.S.
GDP per capita by using the coefficient estimate and determining the difference
between the U.S.'s value of that composite or individual measure and the mean
value of the top five countries for 2012 for the specific measure, following the
Crains' methodology. Because each of the individual GCI components are
designed to measure traits which are independent of each other, the implied costs
to GDP from each can be added together to form an aggregate estimate of the
implied regulatory costs. These costs are displayed in the bottom row of Table
3.
Finally, Table 4 columns (7) and (8) show what happens if the Crains'
composite index of three indicators-il.09 Burden of Government Regulations;
1.11 Efficiency of Legal Framework in Challenging Regulations; and 1.08
Regulation of Securities Exchanges-is deconstructed into components and
substituted in the Crains' regression for ERI. Interestingly, Burden of
Government Regulation only has a small value and is not statistically significant
by traditional measures, when inserted by itself into the Crains' regression in
place of ERI. Regulatory Burden gains a statistically significant regression
coefficient only when bundled with two other measures that do not directly track
regulatory burden.
Table 5 displays the results of a regression that utilizes investment share of
GDP, initial level of real GDP per capita, initial secondary school enrollment
rate, and average annual rate of population growth as independent variables as
suggested by the results of the sensitivity analysis in Levine and Renelt (1992),
across the same time period (2006 - 2013) and the same 34 OECD countries that
were tracked by the Crain and Crain study, along with dummy variables for 2008
and 2009. Column (1) is a regression without the ERI component and shows
statistical significance (at 95 percent) for three of the five independent variables,
with the other two being statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence
level. When the same regression is performed, but with the addition of the ERI
variable as in column (2), the results for the independent variables from column
(1) remain stable, however the ERI component shows no statistical significance
(p-value = 0.872) and changes signs. Regardless, if the coefficient is to be
believed, the estimated effect implies that higher ERI scores correspond to lower
per capita GDP growth.
In keeping with the methodology of the Crain and Crain study, all
regressions are performed without fixed effects and include adjustments for first-
20181
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order autocorrelation. When the correction for first-order autocorrelation is
removed from column (2), the results remain stable, however the coefficient on
ERI decreases even further to -0.059 while remaining statistically insignificant
(p-value = 0.820).
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Table 3
Results of Effort to Reproduce Crain Regression
(t-statistics in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.0 5 )
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita ($2005 USD)
Dependent
Crain & Replication variable: per
Crain Replication using Fixed capita GDPEffects Model growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Econ. Reg. Index (ERI) 0.081* 0.052** -0.030* -0.312
(2.46) (4.72) (-2.34) (-1.02)
Trade / GDP 0.002* .002** 0.001 0.000
(3.60) (5.01) (1.54) (0.08)
Dependency Ratio 0.007 0.023** 0.032** -0.299**
(1.12) (5.10) (4.36) (-4.36)
Tax Revenue / GDP 0.061 0.007 -0.019 0.393
(1.84) (0.41) (-1.14) (1.80)
(Tax Revenue/GDP)2  -0.0007 -0.000 0.000 -0.005
(-1.58) (-0.20) (0.97) (-1.62)
Capital Investment 0.025** 0.004* 0.004* 0.076
GDP
(5.76) (2.22) (2.44) (1.55)
Labor Force 0.075** 0.020 0.102 0.309
(2.57) (0.79) (0.72) (1.44)
Year = 2008 0.100"* 0.037** 0.033** -2.235**
(-2.38) (-2.82) (2.77) (-4.32)
Year = 2009 0.132** 0.071** -0.026** -6.626**
(-3.52) (-6.39) (-2.70) (-13.56)
Constant 7.15* 8.999** 9.107** -3.448
(10.35) (22.88) (22.64) (-0.72)
Observations 219 221 188 221
R-squared (overall) 0.58 0.300 0.000898
Implied Cost in 2012 $1.439 $0.938 -$0.528 N/A
(trillion $2014 USD) I
2018]
ECOLOGY LA W QUARTERLY
ANNEX
Table 4
Robustness Check Using Alternate Independent Variables (Part 1)
(t-statistics in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05)
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita ($2005 USD)
[1.04] Public [1.07] [1.08]
trust in [1.06] Judicial Favoritism by Wastefulness
politicians independence government of gov.officials spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Alternate Variable of 0.045** 0.050** 0.033* 0.050**
Interest (col. 1-4)
(4.18) (3.56) (2.49) (3.48)
Trade / GDP 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(4.99) (4.74) (4.53) (4.80)
Dependency Ratio 0.026** 0.027** 0.027** 0.029**
(6.03) (6.21) (6.15) (6.51)
Tax Revenue / GDP 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.005
(0.43) (0.48) (0.41) (0.28)
(Tax Revenue/GDP) 2  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.26) (-0.35) (-0.29) (-0.14)
Capital Investment! 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
GDP
(0.52) (1.26) (1.09) (0.44)
Labor Force 0.022 0.020 0.014 0.018
(0.94) (0.80) (0.57) (0.72)
Year = 2008 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006
(0.52) (0.42) (0.54) (0.63)
Year = 2009 -0.049** -0.048** -0.048** -0.044**
(-4.80) (-4.91) (-4.62) (-4.50)
Constant 8.997** 8.876** 9.089** 9.027**
(23.04) (21.87) (22.58) (22.73)
Observations 221 221 221 221
R-squared (overall) 0.370 0.343 0.278 .307
Implied Cost of
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Table 4 (cont'd)
Robustness Check of Crain Using Alternative Independent Variables (Part 2)
(t-statistics in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05)
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita ($2005 USD)
[1.15] [1.18] Strength [1.09] Burden Composite
Organized of audit & of Government of [1.09]
crime reporting Regulations and [1.11]
standards
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Alternative variable of
interest (col. 5 - 8) 0.065** 0.013 0.019 0.036**
(4.60) (0.79) (1.23) (3.07)
Trade / GDP 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(4.29) (4.06) (4.11) (4.46)
Dependency Ratio 0.028** 0.030** 0.030** 0.026**
(6.59) (6.55) (6.59) (5.86)
Tax Revenue / GDP 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008
(0.40) (0.37) (0.44) (0.46)
(Tax Revenue/GDP)2
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.30) (-0.35) (-0.40) (-0.33)
Capital Investment /
GDP 0.004* 0.002 0.002 0.002
(2.42) (1.34) (1.47) (1.38)
Labor Force 0.030 0.008 0.011 0.015
(1.09) (0.30) (0.42) (0.60)
Year = 2008 0.003 0.012 0.010 0.014
(0.41) (1.36) (1.21) (1.65)
Year = 2009 -0.049** -0.040** -0.040** -0.029**
(-5.49) (-4.23) (-4.25) (-2.91)
Constant 8.682** 9.186** 9.153** 9.080**
(21.13) (22.35) (22.24) (22.64)
Observations 221 221 221 221
Implied Cost of
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Table 5
Robustness Check of Cramin Using Alternative Independent Variables (Part 2)
(t-statistics in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05)




Initial Secondary School Enrollment Rate 9.612* -9.566*
(base year = 2006) -9.612* -9.566*
(-2.25) (-2.26)
Capital Investment / GDP 0.317** 0.316**
(7.87) (7.85)
Average Rate of Population Growth 0.705 0.710*
(1.95) (1.99)
Initial real GDP per capita -0.000"* -0.000"*
(base year = 2006)
(3.29) (-3.06)
Foreign Trade GDP 0.007 0.007
(1.86) (1.85)
Year = 2008 -2.933** -2.908**
(-7.73) (-7.53)





R2 (overall) 0.560 0.559
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online
journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact cse.elq@law.berkeley.edu. Responses to articles
may be viewed at our website, http://www.ecologylawquarterly.org.
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